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ABSTRACT
Federal courts routinely apply state law. In diversity cases, federal courts apply the state law that the forum state
would apply—the so-called Klaxon rule. Outside of diversity, the vitality of Klaxon is far less clear. Federal
courts have departed from Klaxon when applying state law in cases arising under bankruptcy, admiralty, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and more. Scholars have called for courts to abandon Klaxon in cases arising
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) or consolidated as multidistrict litigation (MDL).
These departures from Klaxon might track offhand references to “diversity” in Klaxon and other Erie cases,
but they are inconsistent with jurisdictional and institutional policies of Erie and its progeny. The policies of
reducing jurisdictional manipulation and the resulting inequities are relevant no matter the basis of federal
jurisdiction. And the policies of respecting state interests and constraining federal judicial lawmaking point to state
choice-of-law rules whenever the court has decided to apply state law. Taken together, these policies call for the
extension of Klaxon to any case in which state law applies in federal court—and perhaps to other cases where
state law plays a role in federal law.
Much like Erie itself, these policy concerns are particularly important given the sociolegal context. In Erie, it was
the manipulation of diversity jurisdiction that allowed corporate defendants to obtain preferable treatment. Today,
it is bankruptcy, CAFA, and MDL that might create those opportunities. Extending Klaxon is the only response
consistent with the policies of Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the federal jurisdictional statutes. Otherwise,
the accident of federal jurisdiction will unjustifiably alter the state law to be applied.
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This is an article about what Professor Burbank might call lawyers’ law.1 It treats of some difficult problems in
a corner of conflict of laws that proceduralists have occupied—where state and federal law vie for space—among
them problems that Professor Burbank set out to solve early in his career.2 It treats as well of a decision last
Term,3 and a decision two decades ago4 in which the Supreme Court accepted the most controversial of the
solutions Professor Burbank proposed fifteen years prior.5 More broadly, my hope is to cast some light both on the
question whether shopping into federal jurisdiction is a problem worthy of concern today and on the immense
contribution of Professor Burbank to procedural scholarship.6

1

2

3
4
5

6

See Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1027, 1027 & n.1 (2002) [hereinafter Burbank, Semtek] (“This is an Article about what Justice
Jackson would have called lawyers’ law.”) (citing Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The
Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1945)).
See id. at 1027 (“It treats of some difficult problems in a corner of conflict of laws that proceduralists
have occupied—where state and federal law vie for space—problems that I set out to solve early in
my career.”) (citing Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986) [hereinafter Burbank,
Interjurisdictional Preclusion]).
Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713 (2020).
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
See Burbank, Semtek, supra note 1, at 1027–28 (“It treats as well of a decision last Term in which the
Supreme Court accepted the most controversial of the solutions I proposed fifteen years ago.”)
(citing Semtek).
See id. at 1028 (“More broadly, my hope is to cast some light both on the question whether forum
shopping between state and federal court is a problem worthy of concern today and on the nature,
including the politics, of procedural scholarship.”).
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most watched piece of complex litigation in American courts
involves the lawsuits arising from the national opioid epidemic.7 Municipal,
state, and other plaintiffs have filed tens of thousands of lawsuits against the
manufacturers and distributors of opiates, frequently arising under state law.
Countless state law claims have ended up in federal court,8 variously based
on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, federal
question jurisdiction, Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) jurisdiction, federal
officer removal, and more.9 There was even a case filed by the State of
Arizona under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States.10 The district court cases were consolidated in a federal multidistrict
litigation (MDL) in the Northern District of Ohio in front of Judge Dan
Polster.11 Then, in 2019, Purdue Pharma filed for bankruptcy in New York
and sought a stay of ongoing litigation, potentially bringing pending claims
against it into the bankruptcy proceeding.12
Why, you might wonder, did the prior paragraph make so much of the
various jurisdictional hooks in the opioid litigation? A claim is a claim is a
claim, right?

7

8

9

10

11
12

See generally In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-2804 (N.D. Ohio filed Sept. 25, 2017)
(opioid docket); Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html
[https://perma.cc/U6EB-GYBJ] (discussing opioid MDL judge).
For more on state court opioid litigation, see Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, Opioid
Cases and State MDLs, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. 245 (2021); and Roger Michalski; MDL Immunity: Lessons
from the National Prescription Opiate Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175 (2019).
See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Seminole Cty., Okla. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CIV-18-372JWL, 2019 WL 1474397, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 3, 2019) (removing the case based on diversity of
citizenship); Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Sackler, No. 19-62992-CIV-MARTINEZ, 2020 WL
1046601, at *2–4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2020) (removing the case because the issue was a federal
question); City of Henderson v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3:19-cv-00067-GFVT, 2020 WL 428112,
at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2020) (removing the case based on supplemental jurisdiction); In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., 327 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1070–79 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (removing the case
based on the doctrine of federal officer removal); Louisa Cty., Va. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No.
3:19-cv-00027, 2019 WL 6219872, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 24, 2019) (removing the case because it
arose under the Class Action Fairness Act, a federal statute).
See State v. Sackler, 140 S. Ct. 812 (mem.) (2019); Arizona v. Sackler, Dkt. No. 22O151 (U.S. 2019).
See generally Adam Liptak, Arizona Files Novel Lawsuit in Supreme Court Over Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/us/politics/arizona-supreme-courtopioid-sackler.html [https://perma.cc/W59H-576C].
See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-2804, 2019 WL 4686815, at *6 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 26, 2019).
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Not so fast. Anyone who has taken first year Civil Procedure knows (or
should know13) that federal courts may apply state law—the Erie doctrine14—
and that, when sitting in diversity, the state law to be applied is the law that
the forum state’s highest court would apply—the Klaxon rule.15 But what we
may not tell our Civil Procedure students is that the reach of Klaxon beyond
diversity is not so clear. Federal courts have departed from Klaxon when state
law arises in bankruptcy, admiralty, and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
cases, and in cases within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.16
Scholars have further called for federal courts to ignore Klaxon in CAFA and
MDL cases.17 If these scholars had their way, a state law claim in the opioid
litigation might have been governed by different state law when filed in state
court, when removed to federal court under CAFA, and when consolidated
in a different court as an MDL. And even without the scholarly intervention,
a defendant’s decision to file for bankruptcy—for example, a so-called mass
tort bankruptcy18—might have the effect of changing the state substantive
law to be applied to pending claims.
This Article argues that these results are at variance with the policies of the
Erie doctrine; they are inconsistent with the Rules of Decision Act; and they
draw no support from the federal jurisdictional statutes. A better approach is
to follow Klaxon whenever state law applies in federal court—and perhaps in
situations where state law is otherwise incorporated into federal law.
Support for this approach comes from both the jurisdictional and
institutional policies of Erie. The jurisdictional policies of Erie are often
characterized as the “twin aims” of reducing forum shopping and avoiding
the inequitable administration of the laws. These laudable goals are
implicated when state law applies in federal court regardless of the basis of
federal jurisdiction. Indeed, if we take seriously Justice Brandeis’s concern
with the social context of jurisdictional manipulation,19 applying different law
to CAFA, MDL, and bankruptcy poses particular problems in light of the
parties to whom those bases might be available. So although Erie cases

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 50 (2006) (“All eighteen current
civil procedure casebooks cover Erie, devoting an average of sixty-three pages to it . . . .”).
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
See infra Section I.B.
Id.
See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
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occasionally talk about the “accident of diversity,” the policies of Erie, if not
construed in a “crabbed or wooden fashion,”20 sweep more broadly.
The institutional policies of Erie also support extending Klaxon to these
other cases. The Erie doctrine embodies two significant institutional policies:
the protection of state interests and the desire to constrain federal judicial
lawmaking. Extending Klaxon to any issue arising under state law furthers
these twin institutional aims. Klaxon acknowledged that state interests are
expressed not only in substantive law but also in choice of law. Klaxon also
reflected the Supreme Court’s concern that federal judges could circumvent
Erie by smuggling federal lawmaking through the choice-of-law backdoor.
Erie’s institutional goals do not depend in any way on the basis of federal
jurisdiction, and none of the federal jurisdictional statutes suggest any
congressional intent to alter the choice of state law in federal court. Indeed,
to the extent Congress expressed any opinion on choice of law, it would be
in the Rules of Decision Act, which calls for federal courts to apply state law
without any mention of the jurisdictional basis.
Importantly, the inconsistent choice-of-law treatment identified in this
Article sometimes operates between state and federal courts, and sometimes
between bases of federal jurisdiction. As a result, we cannot limit our gaze to
federal-state forum shopping, but we also must consider shopping among bases
of jurisdiction. Some parties, for example, might be able to choose whether
claims are litigated as diversity cases, CAFA cases, MDLs, or in bankruptcy.
This ability to “jurisdiction shop” supports having the same horizontal
choice-of-law rule independent of the basis of federal jurisdiction. Because
Klaxon is not going anywhere,21 it should extend to all bases of federal
jurisdiction when state law applies. This conclusion suggests two versions of
this Article’s claim. The strong version is that federal courts should follow
Klaxon when choosing among states’ laws, period. The weak version is that,
conditional on Klaxon being the rule for diversity cases (and many other types
of cases), it also should be the rule for all other bases of federal jurisdiction,
as a consistent choice-of-law approach is preferred.22 So even for those who
dislike Klaxon, this Article suggests that it would be a mistake for that rule to
govern some but not all federal cases.
20

21
22

Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the Rules of
Decision Act); see Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2 (quoting this phrase with respect to
the proper interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act). Hart, according to Burbank, had a “crabbed
and sterile view” of Erie’s social purposes. See Burbank, Semtek, supra note 1, at 1053 n.110.
Given the signals from the Supreme Court and the lack of any from Congress, this seems like a
reasonable assumption. See infra note 51.
For more on this weak form, see infra notes 170 & 191.
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Nothing in this Article, by the way, depends on some quantitative
accounting of the frequency with which parties shop for different choice-oflaw rules. Indeed, such an accounting is impossible for CAFA and MDL
where courts have not (yet?) departed from Klaxon. But it must be true that
arties care about the law to be chosen—it is what determines whether they
will be hanged in Professor Silberman’s famous quip.23 And however
frequently parties shop for choice of law, the ability to shop can result in
unequal treatment between those with access to particular bases of
jurisdiction and those without such access, and it can intrude on state interest
and empower federal judges without cause.
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows.24 Part I briefly reviews the
Klaxon decision and its critics, before exploring in more detail the areas in
which federal courts depart from Klaxon or in which scholars have claimed
that they should. Part II argues that the Klaxon rule should be extended to all
cases where state law is applied in federal court. It first shows how the
concerns with jurisdictional manipulation that motivated Erie are not limited
to diversity cases, and that today’s Black & White Taxicab25 could involve the
manipulation of jurisdiction via bankruptcy, CAFA, or MDL. This Part then
details how the jurisdictional and institutional policies of Erie, supported by
the Rules of Decision Act and the federal jurisdictional statutes, point to the
use of Klaxon beyond diversity. Part III then proposes tentative extensions of
these arguments: courts should follow Klaxon when federal common law or a
federal statute looks to state law, and federal preclusion law should adopt
state law for judgments arising under state law regardless of the basis of
federal jurisdiction.26 In short, Klaxon all the way down.27
23

24

25

26

27

Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978) (“To
believe that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state should be stronger under the due process
clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more
concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.”).
I feel tempted here to invoke Professor Burbank’s statement about his work on interjurisdictional
preclusion: “This is a long article about an exquisitely difficult subject.” See Burbank, Interjurisdictional
Preclusion, supra note 2, at 829.
Justice Brandeis in Erie cited Black & White Taxicab v. Black & Yellow Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518 (1928),
as an example of a corporate defendant manipulating federal jurisdiction by changing its citizenship
to create diversity.
To be more precise, Part III suggests three possible extensions. First, while federal courts have been
unclear (at best) about how they select the state law to be adopted as federal common law, I argue
that Klaxon should inform the horizontal choice of adopted law. Second, for the same reasons that
Klaxon should apply to state law outside of diversity, Semtek’s adoption of state law for preclusion
should turn on the source of law rather than the basis of jurisdiction. Third, Klaxon should be the
presumptive approach when courts are interpreting federal statutes pointing to state law.
See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 754 n.14 (2006) (“[A]n Eastern guru affirms that
the earth is supported on the back of a tiger. When asked what supports the tiger, he says it stands
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I. KLAXON AND ITS DISCONTENTS
A. Klaxon
It always starts with Erie.28 When the Erie doctrine calls for the application
of state law,29 it raises a question of horizontal choice of law—an issue,
unfortunately for Harry Tompkins, to which the Erie Court gave little
attention.30
Three years after Erie, the Supreme Court took up horizontal choice of
law in Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.31 Klaxon was a breach-ofcontract case, filed in the District of Delaware. The district court applied
New York contract law to the claim. What proved a more vexing question
was the law governing prejudgment interest. The district court and court of
appeals applied New York law, seemingly following a federal choice-of-law
rule.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the choice-oflaw question should be answered by forum law (here Delaware law).32 As the
Court observed, “Subject only to review by this Court on any federal

28

29

30

31

32

upon an elephant; and when asked what supports the elephant he says it is a giant turtle. When
asked, finally, what supports the giant turtle, he is briefly taken aback, but quickly replies ‘Ah, after
that it is turtles all the way down.’”).
The lesson that “all legal questions are Erie questions” is one that I learned from Professor Kevin
Clermont, but this is not his Festschrift, so it is relegated to the footnotes. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 188 (6th ed. 2021) (“[T]he simple fact is that every question of
law in a federal system such as ours is preceded by the choice-of-law problem of whether the legal
question is a matter of state or federal law. ‘Every question of law’ means all tasks of making or
applying law, whether by public or private actors. If a police officer or a car driver is trying to
determine the speed limit, that person needs first to resolve whether state or federal law governs by
determining the choice that the Constitution, Congress, or courts have made or would make.”).
I refer to the “application” of state law consistent with the distinction between adopting and
applying, see generally Kevin M. Clermont, Degrees of Deference: Applying vs. Adopting Another Sovereign’s
Law, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 243(2018), and consistent with the Rules of Decision Act’s use of
“apply.” 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018). Cf. ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & DONALD THEODORE
TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1049–51 (1965) (speaking in terms of
“supplementation” and “delineation”). For more on the adoption of state law, see infra Part III.
As Professor Purcell observed, had the Erie Court considered the horizontal choice of law and
applied a Klaxon-like approach, then it likely would have selected New York general law, under
which Tompkins may have recovered. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants,
Lawyers, Judges, Politics and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES (Kevin M.
Clermont 1st ed., 2004) at n.145.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). For more background on Klaxon, see
Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 770–77 (2012).
Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496 (“The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware
must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.”).
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question that may arise, Delaware is free to determine whether a given
matter is to be governed by the law of the forum or some other law.”33 More
generally, in cases in which it applies, the Klaxon rule calls for federal courts
to follow the horizontal choice of law of the forum state, without exception.34
At least three reasons support the Klaxon approach. First, a fundamental
policy of Erie is reducing the incentives for intrastate forum shopping,35
particularly with reference to matters of substantive law, though it does not
track a “substance-procedure” line.36 As Ed Purcell teaches, the need for
intrastate uniformity to counter jurisdictional manipulation by corporate
defendants motivated Erie in the first place.37 Soon after Erie, it became
apparent that choice of law in federal court could be an avenue to undercut
this policy goal,38 as choice of law could lead to different law being applied
in state and federal courts.39 Klaxon could be understood, therefore, as a patch
on a hole in the Erie doctrine through which intrastate disuniformity could
have crept.40
Second, the Erie line embodies a notion of federalism that is attentive to
state substantive policies.41 Choice-of-law rules are expressions of substantive
policies.42 So when we talk about Erie respecting the value of federalism, that
respect should extend to choice-of-law federalism.43 To be sure, the

33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43

Id. at 496–97.
See, e.g., id.; Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938) (explaining the Court’s decision to
overturn the discriminatory Swift v. Tyson decision which “made rights enjoyed under the unwritten
‘general law’ vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal
court”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (noting that the Erie decision was in part a
reaction to the practice of forum-shopping in the wake of Swift v. Tyson).
See, e.g., Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (explaining that Erie did not draw firm lines
between “substantive” and “procedural” laws).
See infra note 134 and accompanying text (citing Purcell sources and summarizing his views on Erie).
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Choice of Law and Jurisdictional Policy in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1847 (2017).
See, e.g., Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228, 242
(1964) (“[T]he choice-of-law rules of a state are important expressions of its domestic policy.”);
Bradt, supra note 31, at 775–76. Professor Wolff suggested that this choice-of-law analysis should be
divided into inquiries into the reach of a state’s law (which is a matter of state interest) and the
resolution of conflicts among state laws (which, at least in federal court, is a matter of federal
interest). See Wolff, supra note 38, at 1884. But the resolution of conflicts among state laws is also a
matter of state interest, reflected in state rules on choice of law (where they apply).
See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, Forum Selection After Atlantic Marine: Atlantic Marine and Choice-of-Law
Federalism, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 617 (2015); David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the
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application of forum-state choice of law in federal court will lead to
horizontal disuniformity. But as Justice Reed said in Klaxon, “Whatever lack
of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is
attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging
from those of its neighbors.”44 In other words, horizontal disuniformity is
part of Erie’s federalism.
Third, among the many lessons Professor Burbank has taught is that one
must be cognizant of the institutional interests of judges, which often run
toward increasing judicial power.45 Central to Erie is the reining in of federal
judicial lawmaking.46 Klaxon furthers this aim too. The mechanical
application of forum-state choice of law takes power out of the hands of
federal judges, reallocating it to the states (by incorporating state choice-oflaw doctrine) and to Congress (by leaving open the possibility for federal
choice-of-law legislation).47
B. Not Klaxon
The Klaxon decision has generated much consternation. As Professor
Burbank observed, the central objection to Klaxon “is a complaint, most
prominently associated with Henry Hart, that has been repeated by
generations of scholars who have been in Hart’s thrall.”48 Hart criticized
Klaxon because it encouraged interstate forum shopping, a problem he thought
could be avoided by federal choice-of-law rules.49 I could go on at length with
other versions of this general criticism and with rejoinders from Purcell,

44
45
46
47

48

49

Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732 (1963); Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the
Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 345 (1960).
Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
See, e.g., Burbank, Semtek, supra note 1, at 1054 (referring to federal judges’ “perfectly natural desires
to maximize their own power and to serve their own institutional interests”).
See Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
This argument recalls Cavers’s and Currie’s earlier defenses of Klaxon. These scholars acknowledged
that when the forum state was “disinterested,” the arguments in favor of Klaxon were diminished.
But they were reluctant to jettison Klaxon even in these situations because the alternative was
empowering federal judges to make federal common law rules for choice of law. See, e.g., David F.
Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, MEMORANDUM FOR
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS, (Tentative Draft No. 1 Apr. 30, 1963) at 14; Bradt, supra note 31, at 802-04.
Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1924, 1940 (2006) [hereinafter Burbank, Couch] (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 512–13 (1954)).
See, e.g., Hart, supra note 48, at 715.
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Burbank, Cavers, and others.50 But Congress and the Supreme Court have
given no indication that they intend to overrule Klaxon,51 so as a concession to
the shortness of life,52 I discuss here the more focused attacks on Klaxon.
There is no doubt (at least in my mind) that the Erie doctrine governs when
state law applies in federal court, regardless of whether the case relies on
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.53 But what about Klaxon? On the same day
as Klaxon, the Supreme Court decided Griffin v. McCoach.54 Griffin applied
Klaxon to select the applicable state law in a statutory interpleader action that
could not have been filed in state court in the forum state.55 So literally from
day one, Klaxon was not limited to diversity cases. In addition, a review of
lower federal court decisions finds that federal courts follow Klaxon not only
for diversity cases but also when applying state law in federal question and

50

51

52
53

54
55

See, e.g., infra note 134 (collecting Purcell sources); Burbank, Couch, supra note 48; Cavers, supra note
43; Cavers, supra note 47; Bradt, supra note 31; Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice
of Law in Federal Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2013).
See, e.g., Day & Zimmermann v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Bradt, supra note 31, at 783 (“The
Supreme Court has shown no willingness to overrule Klaxon, and the Congress has declined to enact
federal choice-of-law rules despite several opportunities.”).
This is a phrase I can hear in Professor Burbank’s voice, and Westlaw tells me he used in eight
articles over three decades.
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4520
(3d ed.) (2021 Update) (“It frequently is said that the doctrine of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins
applies only in diversity of citizenship cases; this statement simply is wrong.”) (footnote omitted);
Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540–41 n.1 (1956) (“[D]espite repeated
statements implying the contrary, it is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on which
federal jurisdiction over the case is founded, which determines the governing law. Thus, the Erie
doctrine applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its
source in state law.”) (internal citation omitted); see, e.g., Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967) (discussing Erie in federal question case); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966) (citing Erie in pendent jurisdiction case). But see Alexander A. Reinert, Erie Step Zero, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2341 (2017).
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
Id.
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supplemental jurisdiction cases.56 And for many other jurisdictional bases,
there is no indication that federal courts do anything but Klaxon.57
But for a few jurisdictional bases, federal courts have charted other
courses. And scholars critical of Klaxon have argued that federal courts should
decline to follow Klaxon in certain other categories of cases. The balance of
this Section reviews the areas where Klaxon is not followed or is under threat.58
Bankruptcy
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal bankruptcy
proceedings and concurrent jurisdiction over claims that arise in or relate to
the bankruptcy proceeding.59 This jurisdiction includes what the law calls
“core” and “non-core” claims. “Core” claims arise from the Bankruptcy Act
or would not exist without it, while “non-core” claims are merely related to
the bankruptcy.60
Both “core” and “non-core” claims may arise under state law, and state
law issues may arise in any bankruptcy proceeding. To give a recent an
example, in Rodriguez v. FDIC, the Supreme Court held that state law provides

56

57

58

59
60

See, e.g., Fagin v. Gilmartin, 432 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (federal question); Shannon-Vail Five
Inc. v. Bunch, 270 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal question); Dykes v. DePuy, Inc., 140
F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 1998) (supplemental jurisdiction); see also, e.g., A.K. Stamping Co. v. Instrument
Specialties Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 627, 647 n.28 (D.N.J. 2000) (applying Klaxon to supplemental state
law unfair competition claims that are related to “copyright, patent, plant variety protection or
trademark” claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b)).
Of course, one can find occasional deviations even in these areas. See, e.g., Corporacion Venezolana
de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 791–92 (2d Cir. 1980) (relying on federal choice
of law in Edge Act case). But see Loreley Financing (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Securities,
LLC, 797 F.3d 160, n.5 (2d Cir. 2015) (questioning this approach).
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1343, 1349, 1361, 1369. With respect to the last of these sections, earlier
proposals for multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction included a choice-of-law provision, but it did not
appear in the final version. See id.; CRS Report For Congress, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 2002, P.L. 107-273, Order Code RS20861 (Updated December 10, 2002)
(comparing bills). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project
Rests, 54 LA. L. REV. 977 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation,
70 TEX. L. REV. 1623 (1992); Thomas Rowe & Kenneth Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986).
I omit here what Wright & Miller considers to be the first exception to Klaxon, i.e., where application
of the forum state’s choice-of-law rule would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due
Process Clause. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4506 (3d ed.) (2021 Update) (citing inter alia Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(1981) and Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953)). I do not consider this an exception
as much as a constitutional limit.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334; 28 U.S.C. § 157.
Id. Final jurisdiction over non-core claims may not be exercised by federal bankruptcy judges
consistent with Article III. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
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the rule for the distribution of tax refunds following a consolidated return, an
issue presented in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.61 Or to give a more well-known
example, the claims at issue in Northern Pipeline—a case addressing the
constitutionality of bankruptcy court jurisdiction—alleged breach of
contract, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress under
state law.62
Because bankruptcy proceedings may involve issues of state law, they also
may involve the horizontal choice of law. The Erie doctrine applies in
bankruptcy,63 but federal courts are split on the application of Klaxon in
bankruptcy. Some lower courts faithfully apply Klaxon.64 The Ninth Circuit
expressly departs from Klaxon for state law issues in bankruptcy cases, applying
instead an approach modeled on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws.65 The Second and Fourth Circuits say that they follow Klaxon, but they
permit deviation in service of a strong federal interest,66 which is inconsistent
with the treatment of state law under Klaxon and Erie.67 (Followers of the Erie
doctrine will recognize similarities between this approach and Kimbell Foods’s
adoption of state law,68 a topic to which I turn below.)69 Professor Cross,

61
62
63

64

65
66

67
68
69

Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713 (2020).
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633 (2004);
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004). I do not here treat the choice between federal and foreign law
in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Hannah L Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of
Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. OF INT’L L. 23, 26–37 (2000).
See, e.g., In re Syntax-Brillian Corp., 573 F. App’x 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2014) (“‘The conflict of laws
rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s
state courts.’”) (quoting Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496); In re Payless Cashways, 203 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th
Cir. 2000) (“The bankruptcy court applies the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.”). The
Sixth Circuit seems on the fence. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 778 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Although we long ago applied Klaxon to a choice of law issue arising under a previous version of
the Bankruptcy Code . . . we have not weighed in on the recent circuit split, and we do not address
that broad question.”).
In re Miller, 853 F.3d 508, 515–16 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th
Cir.1995)).
In re Merritt Dredging Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1988) (“We believe, however, that in
the absence of a compelling federal interest which dictates otherwise, the Klaxon rule should prevail
where a federal bankruptcy court seeks to determine the extent of a debtor’s property interest.”); In
re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 601–02 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e decide that bankruptcy courts
confronting state law claims that do not implicate federal policy concerns should apply the choice
of law rules of the forum state.”).
See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 US 3 (1975); see also Clermont, supra note 29.
See supra note 29 (distinguishing adoption and application); Clermont, supra note 29 (same, in more
detail).
See infra Section III.A.
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among others, also has made the case that Klaxon should not apply in
bankruptcy.70
Part of the explanation for the departures from Klaxon can be found in
Supreme Court dicta. In 1946, the Supreme Court in Vanston Bondholders
Protective Committee v. Green held that federal law provided the rule of decision
on the issue whether to require the payment of interest on unpaid interest.71
The Court, in other words, concluded that the Erie analysis pointed to federal
law.72 In dicta, the Court went on to opine about the appropriate horizontal
choice-of-law methodology when a bankruptcy case called for the application
of state law, implying that at least under some circumstances a federal court
would apply a federal choice-of-law method informed by the Bankruptcy
Act.73 Based on this dictum, some have concluded that Klaxon does not apply
in cases sounding in bankruptcy,74 and some have pointed to Vanston
Bondholders as support for broader attacks on Klaxon.75
There are any number of reasons to discount Vanston Bondholders’ dicta,76
including more recent dicta pointing the other way. In the Rodriguez decision,

70
71
72

73

74
75
76

See John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 572 (1989).
Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
The Court stated: “In determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor’s assets shall be
distributed, a bankruptcy court does not apply the law of the state where it sits. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
has no such implication.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Professor Wolff takes this language to mean
that Erie “had no application in bankruptcy.” See Wolff, supra note 38. The validity of this statement
depends on what we mean by “Erie.” If Erie means the selection of federal or state law, than this is
decidedly not true, for courts sitting in bankruptcy routinely choose between federal and state law.
See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. I read the statement to mean that Erie does not require
the application of state law on this question. One might, therefore, think about this statement as
more akin to Clearfield’s statement that “the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins does not apply to this
action,” even though it essentially applied the prevailing Erie method. See Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (internal citation omitted); see also Clermont, supra note 29
(“[T]he Clearfield problem[] is no more than a restatement of the Erie problem.”).
Vanston Bondholders, 329 U.S. at 161–62; see, e.g., Wolff, supra note 38, at 1877 (“[Vanston’s] discussion
of the choice-of-law question as involving a balance of the equities among the parties in light of the
policies of the interested states appears to have been influenced strongly by the purposes animating
the Bankruptcy Act itself.”).
See, e.g., 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4518 (3d ed.) (2021 Update).
See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 38 (relying on this language to call to limit Klaxon).
For example, the case was decided in 1946, well before Day & Zimmerman’s more definitive
endorsement of Klaxon in 1975. It also was decided during the era where the Court was still working
the scope and mechanics of Erie. See, e.g., Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). For those who
believe that the Rules of Decision Act plays an important role in Erie cases, that statute exclusively
referred to common law claims until two years after Vanston Bondholders. See 28 U.S.C. § 725
(superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1652). For those who draw their interpretation of Erie’s reach from the
policies of the relevant federal jurisdictional statute, this case was decided under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, superseded by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Among others, the 1978 statute
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for example, the Court cited approvingly to a bankruptcy case from 1979
called Butner v. United States.77 In Butner, the Supreme Court addressed what
law governed the collection of rents during a bankruptcy. The Court applied
state law and, in so doing, made the following observations consistent with
the application of Klaxon:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved
in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving “a
windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.”78

Uniform treatment “within a state” requires the application of Klaxon.
And the talk about a “different result” and “forum shopping” puts this case
squarely in the Erie-Klaxon oeuvre.
In any event, without a clear holding from the Supreme Court, some
federal courts have deviated from Klaxon in bankruptcy cases—meaning that
these courts might apply different law than the forum state’s courts or than
the same federal court would apply under other types of jurisdiction.
Admiralty
Next is admiralty. Much of the law of admiralty is federal law, but state
law may apply in admiralty cases involving commercial regulation in
territorial waters, maritime insurance contracts, environmental issues, safety
regulations, and others.79
When applying state law in admiralty, federal courts typically eschew
Klaxon in favor of the federal choice-of-law methodology described in

77
78

79

greatly expanded bankruptcy jurisdiction’s reach over state law claims as compared to the era of
Vanston Bondholders. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52-56
(1982). And finally, it must be said that the Supreme Court takes a much less friendly view toward
federal common lawmaking today than it did in 1946. See, e.g., 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4518 (3d ed.) (2021 Update)
(making this point about Vanston Bondholders).
See Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S.Ct. 713 (2020) (citing 440 U.S. 48 (1979)).
440 U.S. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). For another piece of
dictum, see BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545–55 (1994) (“To displace traditional
state regulation in such a manner, the federal statutory purpose must be ‘clear and manifest.’
Otherwise, the Bankruptcy Code will be construed to adopt, rather than to displace, pre-existing
state law.”) (internal citations and note omitted).
See generally Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999); Robert Force,
Choice of Law in Admiralty Cases: National Interests and the Admiralty Clause, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1421 (2001).
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Lauritzen v. Larsen, where the Court laid out a test that looks for the sovereign
with the most significant “connecting factors.”80
The dispute in Lauritzen concerned a conflict between federal law and a
foreign nation’s law, and the Court’s language suggested its test was
specifically designed for cases implicating foreign-country law.81 Most
notably, the Court described the “law of the flag” as “[p]erhaps the most
venerable and universal rule of maritime law.”82
And yet, lower courts have used a Lauritzen-like analysis for resolving
purely domestic conflicts (i.e., between U.S. states).83 These courts often work
around the awkwardness of applying Lauritzen to domestic conflicts by
ignoring the original list of “connecting factors” and instead treating Lauritzen
as calling for interests analysis.84
Thus, by applying Lauritzen, federal courts sitting in admiralty depart
from the Klaxon rule. And, again, this means that they may apply different
law than the forum state or the same federal court would apply under another
jurisdictional basis.
3. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) is an unusual statute,
providing (among others) subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction,
removal, immunities, and immunity exceptions for actions against foreign
states.85 Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims

80

81

82
83
84

85

345 U.S. 571, 584–91 (1953) (listing the “Place of the Wrongful Act,” “Law of the Flag,”
“Allegiance or Domicile of the Injured,” “Allegiance of the Defendant Shipowner,” “Place of
Contract,” “Inaccessibility of Foreign Forum,” and “The Law of the Forum” as relevant factors in
this analysis).
See, e.g., id. at 582 (“The criteria [for choice of law in maritime matters], in general, appear to be arrived
at from weighing of the significance of one or more connecting factors between the shipping
transaction regulated and the national interest served by the assertion of authority.”) (emphasis added);
see also Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959) (“The controlling
considerations [in a Lauritzen analysis] are the interacting interests of the United States and of foreign
countries, and in assessing them we must move with the circumspection appropriate when this Court
is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our international relations.”).
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 584.
See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4506 (3d ed.) (2021 Update).
See, e.g., Goodloe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1128 (S.D. Fla. 2019)
(“[T]he Lauritzen factors, at their core, aim to identify the state with the most significant relationship
to the action.”).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–11 (2018); 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3662.2 (4th ed.) (2021 Update).
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against foreign states,86 though Congress intended to encourage the litigating
of these cases in federal court.87
The FSIA has something to say about rules of decision as well. The statute
provides that “the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”88 This aspect
of the FSIA has been described as a “pass-through” for state law.89 But what
state law?90 Wright & Miller asserts that Klaxon does not apply to FSIA
cases.91 The Second and D.C. Circuits use the forum’s choice-of-law rule,
though they claim that they are not compelled to do so by Klaxon.92 The Ninth
Circuit departs from Klaxon altogether and applies a federal choice-of-law
rule based on the Second Restatement.93 So although the FSIA calls for
foreign sovereigns to be liable “to the same extent as private individuals,”
federal courts may apply different state law based on a federal choice-of-law
rule unavailable to private defendants.

86

87
88
89

90

91
92

93

See, e.g., Martropico Compania Naviera S. A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara (Pertamina), 428 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the FSIA granted the federal
district court original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 85.
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (“Congress deliberately sought to
channel cases against foreign sovereigns away from the state courts and into federal courts. . . .”).
28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2018).
See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2017), certified question answered, 194
A.3d 38 (D.C. App. 2018); Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 229 (1996), using the “pass-through”
language in the context of the Warsaw Convention).
Arguably, the FSIA is an example of federal law “adopting” state law as federal law. See supra note
29 (distinguishing “adoption” and “application”). In such a circumstance, we would not expect
Klaxon to govern. But see infra Section III.A (discussing a presumption that Klaxon governs in these
situations). But “arguably” implies that there is another side—i.e, the FSIA might be read to call for
the direct application of state law. For that reason, I discuss it here.
I do not discuss the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) here because I think it likely falls on the other
side of the adoption-application line, and because the FTCA includes a horizontal choice-of-law
provision rendering Klaxon irrelevant. For more on the FTCA, see infra Section III.C.
See 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3662.4 (4th ed.) (2021 Update).
Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People’s Republic of China, 923 F.2d 957, 958–
60 (2d Cir. 1991); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Cassirer
v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 862 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2017); Harris v. Polskie
Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs in Cassirer filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari on this issue in 2021. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza
Collection Foundation, 2021 WL 1910232 (U.S. May 6, 2021).
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2017); Harris v.
Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court granted a petition
for a writ of certiorari in Cassirer. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 142 S. Ct. 55
(Mem) (Sept. 30, 2021).
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Original Jurisdiction
Given its recent star turn,94 I also should briefly mention the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction controversies
between two or more states, and it has nonexclusive original jurisdiction over
actions involving ambassadors, controversies between the United States and a
state, or actions by a state against citizens of another state or aliens.95
Some of these cases involve state law. As the Court explained in Kansas v.
Colorado: “Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic,
tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the
exigencies of the particular case may demand.”96 When a state seeks to sue
citizens of another state—as in the opioid case filed by the State of
Arizona97—claims often will arise under state law.98 And many such cases
also could be brought in state or federal-district court.99
The application of Erie and Klaxon in original jurisdiction cases is, at best,
unclear. Wright & Miller says no,100 though it mostly relies on cases that predate Erie or that apply federal common law.101 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals
Corp., decided in 1971, could be read to imply that Erie does not apply in
original jurisdiction matters,102 though Justice Thomas’s opinion in Montana

94

95
96
97
98

99
100
101

102

See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Texas Files an Audacious Suit with the Supreme Court Challenging the Election Results,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/us/politics/texas-files-anaudacious-suit-with-the-supreme-court-challenging-the-election-results.html
[https://perma.cc/NS56-BQHT].
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018).
185 U.S. 125, 146–47 (1902).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Id. (citing Arizona law); see also, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497 (1971)
(“As our social system has grown more complex, the States have increasingly become enmeshed in
a multitude of disputes with persons living outside their borders. Consider, for example, the
frequency with which States and nonresidents clash over the application of state laws concerning
taxes, motor vehicles, decedents’ estates, business torts, government contracts, and so forth.”). But
see id. at 494 (declining to exercise original jurisdiction in such a case).
See 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4052 (3d ed.) (2021 Update).
See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2018) (providing original but nonexclusive jurisdiction).
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 99. An earlier treatment of original jurisdiction was agnostic on
the application of Erie but opposed to the application of Klaxon. See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of
the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665, 680–85 (1959) (suggesting that Erie may apply
and, as to Klaxon, “it would seem appropriate that it either apply its own choice-of-law rules to find
the applicable state law or that it avoid application of the Erie doctrine altogether by applying federal
common law as it has in the interstate cases”).
401 U.S. at 498–99 n.3 (“So far as it appears from the present record, an action such as this, if
otherwise cognizable in federal district court, would have to be adjudicated under state law. Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins.”) (emphasis added).
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v. Wyoming could be read to imply that Erie would apply.103 I cannot find any
original jurisdiction cases discussing Klaxon, meaning that cases such as
Arizona’s filed directly in the Supreme Court might get different choice of
law than if they had been filed in state court or district court.
CAFA and MDL
Two of the most important developments in complex litigation this
century have been the adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(“CAFA”)104 and the rise of multidistrict litigation (“MDL”)105 from a
“disfavored judicial backwater” to the “dominant form of complex litigation
procedure.”106 CAFA formally increased the scope of federal jurisdiction in
complex cases, and MDL has more informally served as a magnet for
complex cases in federal court.107
Though neither CAFA nor the MDL statute includes provisions on
choice of law—and, indeed, a proposal for one in CAFA was defeated in the
Senate108—leading scholars have suggested that Klaxon need not be followed
in cases under these statutes. With respect to CAFA, Professors Burbank,
Issacharoff, Marcus, Nagareda, Silberman, and Wolff have (in one form or
another) suggested that a federal choice-of-law rule might apply in (at least

103

104

105
106

107

108

In footnote 5, Justice Thomas explained that “we find ourselves immersed in state water law” and
that “[o]ur assessment of the scope of these water rights is merely a federal court’s description of
state law.” 563 U.S. 368, 377–78 (2011). He then quoted West v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311
U.S. 223, 236 (1940) for the proposition that “the final arbiter of what is state law.” West is an Erie
case, consistent with the idea that the Supreme Court is “applying” state law.
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For a wonderful
symposium on CAFA in this law review, including contributions of Professor Burbank and many
other attendees of this festschrift, see 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008).
28 U.S.C. § 1407.
Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
511, 552 (2013); Linda S. Mullenix, Reflections of a Recovering Aggregationist, 15 NEV. L.J. 1455, 1469
(2015). I decline to partake in the seemingly obligatory recitation of the share of the federal civil
docket occupied by MDL. See Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297,
1306–07 & nn.36–37 (2020).
See generally Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers
Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251 (2018); Diego A. Zambrano,
Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2101 (2019).
Proposed Amendments at S. 4 to S. 5, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. S1215 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005); see
Burbank, Couch, supra note 48; see also supra note 57 (discussing unadopted proposal for a choice-oflaw provision for multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction).
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some) CAFA cases.109 Professor Sherry wants to ditch Erie in CAFA cases,
presumably taking Klaxon along with it.110
With respect to MDL, current law provides that MDL judges should
apply the choice-of-law rules that would be applied in the transferor courts.111
Professors Atwood, Issacharoff, and Wolff suggest that a federal choice-oflaw rule might be appropriate in MDL cases.112 Professor Field also raised
questions about Klaxon in MDL cases,113 and Professor Bradt called for a
departure from strict adherence to Klaxon in “direct filed” MDL cases, though
his proposal was designed to bring MDL choice of law in closer alignment
with how Klaxon would operate without the consolidation.114 (More on this
last proposal later.115)
Some of the arguments for abandoning Klaxon in CAFA or MDL cases
are revived criticisms of the wisdom of Klaxon in the first place.116 Others seek
to bring CAFA or MDL more directly into the analysis: as “affirmative
109

110
111

112
113
114
115
116

See generally Wolff, supra note 38; Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2008); Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2008); Burbank, Couch, supra note 48; Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in
Choice of Law after the Class Action Fairness Act, 74 UMKC L. REV. 661 (2006) [hereinafter Nagareda,
Bootstrapping]; Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872 (2006) [hereinafter Nagareda, Aggregation]; Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law after the Class Action Fairness Act,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006). Professor Silberman would require Congress to say so expressly,
while others in this list think CAFA itself provides sufficient basis for a federal choice-of-law rule in
some (e.g., Burbank) or all (e.g., Issacharoff) CAFA cases. Of particular relevance to this festschrift,
Professor Burbank suggested that CAFA might be grounds for a federal court to depart from Klaxon
“where [forum] state choice of law doctrine is materially influenced by state policy reflecting a bias
in favor of aggregate litigation . . . .” Burbank, Couch, supra note 48; see also Marcus, supra at 1815
(seemingly agreeing with Burbank). Professor Kane, meanwhile, supported congressional
intervention in choice of law for complex cases more than a decade before CAFA was a reality. See
Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REV.
LITIG. 309, 312 (1991).
See Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National Common Law, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 2135, 2139 (2008).
See, e.g., Bradt, supra note 31. Interestingly, current law provides that the selection of the transferee
district may affect the content of federal law, as transferee judges may apply their circuit’s
interpretation of federal law (rather than applying the transferor court’s interpretation). See, e.g., In
re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See
generally Jeffrey L. Rensberger, The Metasplit: The Law Applied After Transfer in Federal Question Cases,
2018 WIS. L. REV. 847 (collecting cases applying transferee- and transferor-circuit law).
Barbara Ann Atwood, The Choice of Law Dilemma in Mass Tort Litigation: Kicking Around Erie, Klaxon,
and Van Dusen, 19 CONN. L. REV. 9 (1986).
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 913–14
(1986).
Bradt, supra note 31.
See infra Section II.D.
See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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countervailing considerations” in the parlance of Byrd;117 as federal interests
informing the creation of federal common law;118 or as reflecting distinct
jurisdictional policies that, unlike the diversity statute, do not point to
following forum-state choice of law.119 It is frequently argued, for example,
that CAFA or MDL cases are sufficiently “national” to merit a federal
solution to the choice-of-law question.120
Professor Wolff’s call for federal choice-of-law rules in CAFA and MDL
is part of a broader argument about the relationship between federal
jurisdictional policy and choice of law. Wolff argued that Klaxon began as a
narrow holding but has been freighted with significance that was not
intended.121 One of Wolff’s key analytical moves was to suggest that the
resolution of conflicts among state laws that might plausibly apply is a distinct
choice-of-law question to be answered by federal law and with reference to
federal interests.122 He suggested that when the “general diversity statute”
applies,123 this federal interest is balanced against the twin aims of Erie to
produce the Klaxon rule. But in CAFA and MDL cases, Wolff argued that

117

118
119

120
121

122

123

Nagareda, Bootstrapping, supra note 109, at 681–82 (citing Byrd); Nagareda, Aggregation, supra note 109,
at 1920–21 (citing Byrd). But see Burbank, Couch, supra note 48, at 1949 (“Well, yes, but the Court
has not cited [Byrd] very often, and the thrust of its Erie jurisprudence since Byrd has been a
repudiation of the balancing process Byrd seemed to authorize, which in any event balanced one
federal policy against another, not ‘federal and state interests.’”).
See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 38.
See, e.g., Nagareda, Aggregation, supra note 109, at 1911 (“The choice—whether aggregation or forum
should alter substantive law—presents a question about the proper meaning of CAFA as a
manifestation of legislative authority.”); Issacharoff, supra note 109, at 1870 (“[T]he object is to craft a
sensible choice of law rule that corresponds to the identified national scope of the underlying
conduct, the jurisdictional predicate for cases brought into federal court under CAFA.”); Burbank,
Couch, supra note 48, at 1950 (“CAFA certainly works a radical change in jurisdictional policy for
the cases within its reach.”).
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 109; see also infra notes 210–215 and accompanying text.
See Wolff, supra note 38, at 1848 (“Klaxon cannot bear the weight with which it has been loaded.”);
id. (“Klaxon combines a core ruling on the limits of federal judicial power with a highly contextual
statement of federal jurisdictional policy.”).
See id. at 1884 (“[A] core structural feature of choice of law [is] the distinction between the
geographic scope of state law, which is a matter of substantive state policy, and the method of
resolving conflicts when the laws of more than one state extend their geographic reach to cover a
given dispute, which is a question of interstate relations. The interstate relations question—the
resolution of conflicts among interested states—is a federal issue. The Klaxon Court concluded that
it should incorporate a state rule of decision to answer that question in order to satisfy the
jurisdictional policies of the general diversity statute. But the issue is federal in character.”).
Although readers will understand what Professor Wolff means by the “general diversity statute,”
this label does raise the question at what level of generality should one identify jurisdictional policies.
Should we consider 1332(a)(1) alone, 1332(a), 1332(a) and the removal statute’s forum-defendant
rule, all of 1332 (including CAFA)? As explained below, I do not see choice-of-law policy in any of
these provisions, so these are questions I feel comfortable dodging.
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federal interests point to federal law, as those statutes demonstrate stronger
federal interests and (perhaps) less concern for the twin aims.124
As in bankruptcy, admiralty, FSIA, and original jurisdiction cases, these
scholarly proposals—by abandoning Klaxon—call for federal courts to apply
different state law depending on the procedural vehicle in which the case
appears in federal court.
II. APPLYING STATE LAW
This Part argues that federal courts should apply Klaxon whenever state
law applies in federal court—regardless of the basis of jurisdiction.125 This
proposal calls for a change in the law with respect to bankruptcy, admiralty,
FSIA, and original jurisdiction cases, and it calls for resistance against
scholarly proposals to depart from Klaxon in CAFA and MDL cases.
First, the jurisdictional policies of Erie—the twin aims of reducing forum
shopping and avoiding the inequitable administration of the laws126—are not
limited to diversity cases. I use the term “jurisdiction shopping” to describe
the ability of parties to shop into particular bases of federal jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction shopping can lead to the inequitable administration of the laws
when different types of jurisdiction entitle parties to different choice-of-law
rules. To avoid these results, the same choice-of-law rule must apply
regardless of the basis of federal jurisdiction. That rule is Klaxon.127 This
proposal is not only consistent with Erie and its progeny but also with the
federal jurisdictional statutes and the Rules of Decision Act.128
124

125

126
127
128

See Wolff, supra note 38, at 1883 (“CAFA rejects the policy of federal jurisdiction bound up in the
general diversity statute, replacing it with an invitation to litigants to shop for a federal forum in
order to obtain a different result in service of targeted federal goals . . . . Klaxon does not foreclose
the development of a federal rule of decision in resolving conflicts between the local policies of
interested states. Such conflicts present a question of interstate relations that is particularly
appropriate for federal resolution. Hinderlider, Vanston Bondholders, and D’Oench, Duhme together invite
a fresh examination of the proper role of independent federal choice-of-law standards under the
new jurisdictional regime of the federal class action.”); id. at 1890 (“CAFA encourages resultsoriented forum shopping. It marks a fundamental shift away from the jurisdictional policy of the
Erie doctrine.”). For my concerns with these descriptions of CAFA and Erie, see infra notes 187–191
and accompanying text.
The overall conclusion here shares much with earlier work of Professor Green, see Michael Steven
Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 1917 (2013) (“[T]he twin aims should
be used whenever a federal court entertains an action under state law, no matter what the source
of jurisdiction.”), though the road travelled differs considerably. In part due to the different analyses,
the extensions in the next part differ markedly from Green.
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
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Second, recognizing that the Erie doctrine also reflects institutional
policies, I further argue that the extension of Klaxon outside of diversity is
consistent with the twin institutional aims of Erie: the protection of state
interests (a federalism policy) and a reduction in the power of federal judges
to make law (a separation-of-powers policy). These policies also point to the
application of Klaxon whenever state law applies in federal court.129
This Part concludes with a slight departure from strict adherence to
Klaxon to account for horizontal forum changes, building on the elegant
solution proposed by Professor Bradt.130
A. Jurisdictional Policies
Erie is a statement of “a policy of federal jurisdiction.”131 The most
common articulation of the jurisdictional policies of Erie is some version of
the “twin aims,” which the Court later described as “discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”132
Scholars disagree about the source and force of the twin aims, but I think no
one disputes that they are relevant to questions posed by Erie cases.133

129
130
131
132

133

See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.D.
Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945); see also, e.g., Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion,
supra note 2; Wolff, supra note 38.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Professor Burbank offered various formulations of the
jurisdictional policy of Erie, though they typically read something like “federal policy against
different outcomes on the basis of citizenship.” Burbank, Semtek, supra note 1; Burbank,
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2 (same). I would note, however, that Burbank’s analysis
sometimes speaks in terms of “citizenship” but other times speaks in terms of “state law” or “state
substantive rights.” See, e.g., Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at 796 (“The interest
of the federal judiciary in efficiency is unquestionable and unquestionably powerful. Particularly
when state substantive rights are involved, however, it is important that federal judges not be given
free rein to define and pursue that interest.”). As readers can tell, I am more congenial to the latter
formulation. See infra notes 265–71 and accompanying text (making this point with respect to
adoption of state law).
Professor Kramer offered a different set of jurisdictional policies, also congenial with my analysis
here. He wrote: “The guiding policy, drawn from Erie and reflected in the Rules of Decision Act, is
that the mere existence of federal jurisdiction does not justify modifying the parties’ substantive
rights under state law.” Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547
(1996). Or, if one prefers the language of fairness, “it is unfair to change a party’s rights because
lawyers and judges find it expedient to structure a lawsuit one way rather than another.” Id.
Professor Green agreed that the twin aims are jurisdictional policy, but he disassociated them from
Erie. See Green, supra note 125.
See, e.g., Green, supra note 125 (collecting sources and offering his own analysis).
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One of the many lessons I learned from Professor Burbank is that you
cannot understand Erie without reading Ed Purcell.134 Among many other
things, Purcell ably demonstrated that Erie must be understood in context.
Here is Purcell summarizing that context:
Disturbed by the mushrooming tactical escalation and the compounding
waste of social resources, Brandeis began exploring ways to impose greater
order and efficiency on litigation practice. He experimented with the
Commerce Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and even the politically
dangerous Due Process Clause as devices to minimize incentives for
interstate forum shopping. Erie was a part of his overall campaign.
Abolishing the general federal common law would eliminate a major
incentive for intra-state forum shopping and reduce the utility of a variety of
popular manipulative tactics. That achievement, in turn, would mean that
courts and litigants could concentrate their efforts on addressing the
substantive merits of disputes. The result would be to simplify litigation
practice, conserve social resources, and rationally order the overall business
of the nation’s judicial system.135

As Purcell explained, the concerns undergirding Erie related to
jurisdictional manipulation and the inequities that resulted. In the Swift era,
exemplified by cases such as Black & White Taxicab, a popular type of
jurisdictional manipulation involved corporate defendants manipulating
citizenship to get cases into federal court where they would have access to
business-friendly federal common law.136 Such cases directly implicated Erie’s
twin aims.
I have no quarrel with those who read Erie as responding to the
manipulation and resulting inequities that arose from the “accident of
diversity.”137 That was the context in which it was decided. But it would be
a mistake, in my view, to understand Black & White Taxicab as the only version
of this phenomenon.

134

135
136
137

See, e.g., Burbank, Semtek, supra note 1 (citing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 181
(1992); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 43 (2000); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis, Erie, and the New Deal “Constitutional Revolution”,
26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 257 (2001); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm:
Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679 (1999)).
Purcell, Brandeis, supra note 134, at 272.
Id.; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938) (citing Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), (citing Erie).
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Even in the early days of Erie, the twin aims were not limited to cases like
Erie itself.138 Erie was a damages case, but the Supreme Court quickly extended
its reach to equity.139 The Supreme Court also extended Erie to
interpleader,140 bankruptcy,141 and pendent jurisdiction.142 In each of these
situations, the Court was worried about forum shopping and inequitable
administration.
The situations that concern this Article are not just about getting cases
into federal court, but about getting cases into federal court under particular
bases of jurisdiction—what I call “jurisdiction shopping.”143 As we know,
federal courts may hear state law claims (not to mention state law issues)
under various bases of jurisdiction other than diversity of citizenship. If those
bases of jurisdiction offer different choice-of-law rules, then parties will have
incentives to get under or out of those bases—by shopping either between
state and federal court, or between types of jurisdiction within federal court.
This is not to say that parties are motivated entirely by choice of law. Instead,
the claim is that different choice-of-law rules may affect party choice, and
when they do, the resulting treatment is inequitable.144

138

139

140
141

142

143
144

To be sure, not all of the attributes of diversity apply externally. For example, the “forum defendant
rule” bars removal by a properly served forum defendant when the only basis of federal jurisdiction
would be diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). But these differences do not imply that the policies of
Erie are limited to the diversity context. For more on the federal jurisdictional statutes, see infra
Section II.B.
The Court applied Erie to equity in Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938), backtracked in
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940), but then reaffirmed Erie’s application in Guaranty Tr. Co., 326
U.S. at 100. Though York does not explicitly rely on Klaxon, I see no reason to think that it departs
from it. In fact, in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1948), among others, the
Supreme Court noted the applicability of Klaxon in equity.
See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503 (1941) (applying Erie and Klaxon).
See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946) (applying state law
in a bankruptcy proceeding as Erie would require). See generally Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in
Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1953); Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633 (2004).
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
151 (1988) (“Under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, when a federal court exercises diversity or pendent
jurisdiction over state-law claims, ‘the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if
tried in a State court.’”) (internal citation omitted).
This issue has been my concern with MDL-specific rules of procedure addressed in other work,
Clopton, supra note 106.
Indeed, we cannot look at current rates of jurisdiction shopping for CAFA and MDL, because
under current law there is no special choice-of-law rule. If there were, I claim, then we should
expect an increase in jurisdiction shopping. See Clopton, supra note 106 (making a similar point
about MDL shopping). And there is no doubt that the number of cases potentially qualifying for
CAFA and MDL is substantial. See supra note 106 (declining on principle to cite MDL’s share of
civil docket).
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To be more specific, let’s begin with bankruptcy. In 2005, Professor
Gibson identified more than 70 firms that had used bankruptcy to respond
to mass tort litigation.145 “Mass tort bankruptcies” have only become more
important since that time, and we have seen a rise in bankruptcies in the face
of environmental liabilities as well.146 More concretely, as mentioned above,
Purdue Pharma filed for bankruptcy in the face of thousands of pending
state-law claims in state and federal courts arising from the opioid
epidemic.147 Under current doctrine, pending claims brought into a
bankruptcy proceeding would get their state law based on a special federal
choice-of-law rule, potentially switching from the forum state’s choice of law
in state court or federal court sitting in diversity (Klaxon). The option to
declare bankruptcy in the face of mass tort or environmental litigation,148
therefore, has a similar effect as the “accident of diversity” under Swift.
We should expect comparable results if federal courts followed scholars’
suggestions for complex cases. Take CAFA.149 We know that plaintiffs are
trying to structure state actions to avoid removal under CAFA; this maneuver
was part of the story that led to the Supreme Court’s decision on personal
jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers Squibb.150 Imagine that CAFA jurisdiction
changed the substantive law to be applied in federal court. If that were true,
getting into (or out of) CAFA jurisdiction would have a substantial effect on

145

146

147
148
149
150

S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUD. CTR., JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF MASS TORT BANKRUPTCY
CASES
1
(2005),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/gibsjudi_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YPJ2-6G37]; see also Samir D. Parikh, The New Mass Torts Bargain, 90 FORDHAM
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022); Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-class Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (2012); G. Marcus Cole, A Calculus Without Consent: Mass Tort
Bankruptcies, Future Claimants, and the Problem of Third Party Non-Debtor “Discharge”, 84 IOWA L. REV.
753, 765–83 (1999); Anne Hardiman, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future
Claims, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1369 (1985); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
846 (1984). Professor Gibson explained that “[b]eginning in 1982 with the chapter 11 filings of two
asbestos products manufacturers—Johns-Manville Corporation and UNR Industries, Inc.—
bankruptcy courts have become a forum for companies seeking the resolution of pending and
threatened mass tort litigation against them under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.” Gibson,
supra, at 1. For a discussion of mass tort bankruptcies before the 1980s, see Troy A. McKenzie, The
Mass Tort Bankruptcy: A Pre-History, 5 J. TORT L. 59 (2016) (discussing Ringling Brothers).
See, e.g., Lindsey Simon, Bankruptcy Grifters 131 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2022); Vincent S.J. Buccola
& Joshua C. Macey, Claim Durability and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 766 (2021);
Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
When parties have the choice to declare bankruptcy or not, they almost certainly consider the law
to be applied if they do. See supra subsection I.B.1.
Please.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); see also Bradt &
Rave, supra note 107; Howard M. Erichson, John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, CaseLinked Jurisdiction and Busybody States, 105 MINN. L. REV HEADNOTES 54 (2020).
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the fortunes of the parties.151 This would be true in situations when the choice
is between CAFA and state court, or when the choice is between CAFA and
some other type of federal jurisdiction in which Klaxon applied.152
An MDL-only choice-of-law approach would do the same. Parties would
have even more reason to support or oppose consolidation,153 and to support
or oppose particular transferee districts and judges.154 The inequities here
could be within a single MDL: plaintiffs consolidated from different
transferor courts might gain or lose in the choice-of-law manipulation. (The
same could be said of a mass-tort bankruptcy, by the way.)155 MDL shopping
also implicates the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, a group of seven
judges handpicked by the Chief Justice of the United States that has nearly
unfettered discretion to decide whether and where to consolidate cases.156 If
Klaxon did not apply in MDL, then the Panel’s decision about the
appropriateness of consolidation could have the effect of changing the state
law to be applied.157
Jurisdiction shopping is also possible under other forms of jurisdiction.
There are cases in which some parties litigating state law claims have the ability
to shop into (or out of) supplemental jurisdiction,158 federal question jurisdiction
151

152

153

154

155
156

157
158

Cf. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468, n.9 (asking “whether application of the rule would have so important
an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to
cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court”).
For example, Professor Silberman offered this example: “[C]onsider a class action in which all
plaintiffs who reside in the forum state—for example, Texas—sue over conduct engaged in by a
California defendant. The defendant is subject to jurisdiction in Texas, and the events in question
and the plaintiffs all have strong connections with Texas . . . . [I]f the aggregate amount is met, the
action comes within CAFA.” Silberman, supra note 109, at 2028; see also Marcus, supra note 109
(making a similar point about over-inclusivity). Note that Silberman’s hypothetical case also would
qualify for jurisdiction under Section 1332(a), so how federal jurisdiction is characterized would
have consequences for the choice of law.
I have written elsewhere about how MDL-specific rules of procedure would (unjustifiably) create
incentives for parties to try to get into or out of an MDL based on their procedural preferences. See
Clopton, supra note 106.
For more on this process, see generally Zachary D. Clopton & Andrew D. Bradt, Party Preferences in
Multidistrict Litigation, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1713 (2019); and Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E.
George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict
Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 424 (2013).
See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017). If MDL came with different choices of law, then the ability to persuade the
Panel to consolidate cases would determine whether an attempt to jurisdiction shop would be
successful. See Clopton, supra note 106 (raising concerns with increased stakes for the Panel); see also
Andrew D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton, MDL v. Trump: The Puzzle of Public Law in Multidistrict Litigation,
112 NW. U. L. REV. 905 (2018) (making a similar argument regarding public law MDLs).
See Clopton, supra note 106 (raising a similar concern about MDL-specific procedure).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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(e.g., Grable-type claims),159 FSIA jurisdiction,160 original jurisdiction,161 and
admiralty.162 This is nothing new. Then-Professor now-Judge Fletcher wrote
about an early 19th century squabble involving Justice Story (and others) that
revealed concerns with jurisdiction shopping in admiralty.163
Now the relevance of Klaxon should come into focus. Parties can
strategically declare bankruptcy; they can plead cases into or out of CAFA,
directly or on removal; and they can support or oppose consolidation in an
MDL. If these jurisdictional bases entailed a change in the relevant law, then
those parties with the ability to access those types of jurisdiction would be
treated differently. In other words, jurisdiction shopping and inequitable
administration. And it was no accident that this Section emphasized
bankruptcy, CAFA, and MDL—mass torts are candidates to be today’s Black
& White Taxicab.164

159

160

161
162

163

164

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005) (“The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to
hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law
. . . .”).
The FSIA does not create exclusive federal court jurisdiction, so parties might shop from state to
federal court. Moreover, private defendants who might plausibly claim to be agencies or
instrumentalities of a foreign state (for example, due to stock ownership) might shop between FSIA
and diversity jurisdiction in order to obtain more favorable law. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) (discussing foreign state ownership interests).
Many cases within the nonexclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could be filed in
state court or federal district court. See supra note 99.
Consider a maritime insurance dispute between a Connecticut insurer and a Texas shipper. The
Texas shipper sues in Texas state court, and the insurer removes. This dispute looks a typical
diversity-of-citizenship cases, under which Klaxon would direct the choice of law. But if defendant
removed pursuant to admiralty jurisdiction instead, then the choice-of-law approach would shift
from Klaxon to Lauritzen, even though the underlying dispute would be the same. This is a
manipulative tactic to gain access to federal law because of the accident of admiralty.
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984). The dispute arose around De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F.
Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776), a circuit court decision in which Justice Story found
concurrent admiralty jurisdiction over maritime contracts. According to Fletcher, “[t]hose who
opposed De Lovio—most notably, Justice William Johnson of the Supreme Court and James Kent,
recently retired from the New York courts—primarily objected to the expansion of federal
jurisdiction. This was an issue of genuine importance because, under De Lovio, parties of nondiverse
citizenship could bring into the federal admiralty forum claims that would otherwise have been
confined to state forums because of lack of diversity.” Id. at 1551–52 (internal notes omitted).
Meanwhile, diverse parties would have had a choice between admiralty and diversity in these cases.
David Marcus, among others, has noted the parallels between Swift and CAFA. See generally David
Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1247 (2007). For more on the social context of modern procedure, see, for
example, Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005 (2016). And for more
on the rise of aggregate litigation, see, for example, Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
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As Professor Burbank explained (channeling Purcell channeling
Brandeis), “[Erie] reflected its author’s deep concern about the waste and
unfairness that corporate defendants created by jurisdictional manipulation
designed to wear out their opponents and to take advantage of different
substantive law.”165 The policy of Erie, in other words, is that the accident of
federal jurisdiction should not change the laws of the several states in cases where
they apply. For this policy to obtain, the Klaxon rule must apply not to
diversity of citizenship alone but whenever Erie calls for the application of
state law.
Or to say it another way, the Erie doctrine—broadly defined to include
issues of preemption, Reverse Erie, etc.166—points to a preference for
symmetry in the law applied in state and federal court. We might depart from
that preference when the Constitution (e.g., Article III) or Congress (e.g., the
Rules Enabling Act) prescribes rules applicable to only federal or state courts.
And we might tolerate other minimal departures when the issues are
relatively minor, hence all of the talk of “outcome determination.”167 In the
absence of those circumstances, Erie’s twin aims point to symmetry.168
Sometimes that symmetry means federal law, as when federal interests call
for uniform answers.169 But when Erie requires the application of state law,
symmetry is achieved only by Klaxon—regardless of the basis of federal
jurisdiction. Even if Klaxon were not your preferred rule on a clean slate, as
long as Klaxon is the rule for diversity cases, then we need to extend Klaxon to
other areas to avoid incentivizing jurisdiction shopping and the inequitable
administration of the laws.170
B. Jurisdictional Policies and Non-Erie Sources
The previous Section argued that the twin aims, as articulated by the
Supreme Court, apply equally outside of diversity cases. But not all scholars

165
166
167
168

169
170

Burbank, Couch, supra note 48.
See generally Clermont, supra note 13 (defining Erie broadly).
See, e.g., Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Similarly, in another context, Professor Gluck observed that “[t]he driving notion behind Klaxon is
the idea of state-/federal-court [sic] decisionmaking-process uniformity.” Abbe R. Gluck,
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1930
(2011).
This could be Congress, or it could be federal courts when federal law wins in the Erie analysis, such
as in Clearfield Trust. See infra Section III.A (discussing Klaxon in light of the Erie-Clearfield choice).
This is the weak version of my argument mentioned above. See supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
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treat the jurisdictional policies of Erie as free-standing judicial creations.171 If
the twin aims have other sources, then perhaps those sources justify limiting
Klaxon’s reach.
Federal Jurisdictional Statutes. One potential source would be the federal
jurisdictional statutes. And, indeed, critics of Klaxon are quick to latch on to
references to the diversity statute in Erie cases. So for the sake of argument,
let us assume that the federal jurisdictional statutes are the font of Erie’s
jurisdictional policies.172 Perhaps, then, the federal jurisdictional statutes
suggest a narrower reading of the twin aims that is limited to diversity cases,
which would then suggest limiting Klaxon to those cases as well.
In short, the jurisdictional statutes make no such suggestion. That is not
to say they cannot, though. As Professor Burbank explained: “There is
usually no serious question about Congress’s constitutional power to
prescribe uniform federal law for interstate activities. There should be no
question at all that, in the absence of such uniform federal statutory law,
Congress has constitutional power to prescribe choice-of-law rules specifying
the states whose laws shall govern such activities.”173
But Congress’s power to prescribe choice-of-law rules does not tell us
whether Congress has exercised such power. And, if it is fair to describe
Congress as “knowing” things, Congress knows how to prescribe horizontal
choice-of-law rules. For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act chooses the
law of the state of the act or omission,174 and a defeated amendment to CAFA
proposed a federal choice-of-law rule for cases under that statute.175

171
172
173

174
175

See, e.g., Green, supra note 125 (arguing that the twin aims are best understood as products of the
jurisdictional statutes); Wolff, supra note 38 (pointing to the “general diversity” statute).
I take up below what the federal jurisdictional statutes tell us about Erie’s institutional policies. See
infra Section II.C.
Burbank, Couch, supra note 48; see also Kane, supra note 109; Michael Gottesman, Draining the Dismal
Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L. J. 1 (1991). This position, though, is not
universally held. For one enunciation, and for citations to more, see Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice
of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1725 (2006) (“[A]lthough the Full
Faith and Credit Clause clearly grants Congress plenary power to develop or authorize the
development of independent choice-of-law rules binding in both state and federal courts, federal
power under Article III is far more limited. Because choice-of-law rules define substantive rights,
Article III cannot properly be read to authorize the use of independent choice-of-law rules, but
instead requires application of the whole law of a state—that is, the choice-of-law rules and internal
law of a state—selected without regard to its content. Thus, if Congress wishes to displace state
choice-of-law rules in diversity cases, it must enact—or authorize federal courts to develop—choiceof-law rules under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”) (internal footnotes omitted)).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
S. Amendment 4 to S. 5, 109th Cong., 151 Cong. Rec. S1215 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005); see Burbank,
Couch, supra note 48.
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The federal jurisdictional statutes at issue in this Article, however, do no
such thing. To be sure, there are arguments that these jurisdictional statutes
embody some jurisdictional policies.176 Some of these statutes reflect
jurisdictional policies that favor more federal law—which informs the
vertical Erie problem, but not the horizontal choice when state law is to be
applied.177 Some of these statutes reflect jurisdictional policies unrelated to
the Klaxon question. To over-generalize, CAFA is about advantaging federal
judges applying federal procedure (aggregation);178 state law claims in
supplemental jurisdiction,179 bankruptcy,180 and others are about efficiency
and liberal notions of claim joinder;181 FSIA is about immunity from suit and

176

177

178

179

180

181

The policies of any jurisdictional statute are subject to debate. Though scholars and judges are
quick to assign purposes to the diversity statute, for example, it should be acknowledged that “[t]he
proposition that diversity was necessary to protect out-of-state litigants from bias in state courts
emerged as a post-hoc explanation and has translated to only a few minor elements of the statutory
framework over the years.” See Wolff, supra note 38 (citing Purcell). For my part, these revelations
about the supposed purposes of the diversity statute should give us pause in yoking the jurisdictional
policy of Erie to that statute, but as this Section suggests, I find that all relevant sources point to the
same policy, making any one source less consequential.
For example, Wright & Miller suggests that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court itself is
a justification for federal common law. 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. § 4052 (3d ed.) (2021 Update).
Burbank, Couch, supra note 48; Marcus, supra note 109, at 1767 (“Identifying the stated jurisdictional
policy of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) is not difficult. Congress said that the Act
was designed to redress overreaching by state courts handling multistate class actions, to ensure that
these cases involving nationally important issues could be brought into federal court, and to provide
protections for class members.”) (internal footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[Pendent jurisdiction’s]
justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these
are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though
bound to apply state law to them, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.”). See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M. Mengler, Compounding Confusion or Creating Confusion About
Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L. J. 943 (1991).
See, e.g., Green, supra note 125, at 1924-1925 (“[F]ederal bankruptcy jurisdiction was created as an
alternative to the presumptive state fora in order to address a deficiency in state court jurisdiction.
In the case of bankruptcy jurisdiction, the deficiency is a collective action problem. Each creditor
would prefer to be the first to bring an independent state court action against the debtor, in order
to get relief before the debtor’s assets are exhausted. To allow for an efficient and equitable
distribution of these assets—and to protect the debtor herself—it is crucial that all litigation by and
against the debtor be controlled by one court.”).
See, e.g., Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 271-272 (1939);
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute: Conceptions
of Ideal Lawsuit Structure From the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1989); Judith Resnik,
History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W.
VA. L. REV. 171 (1995) (on Calder mobiles).
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about federal forums;182 Supreme Court original jurisdiction may be about a
dignified tribunal, a geographically convenient court, or the enforcement
federal law against the states;183 and MDL is about efficiency and
convenience within the federal court system.184 Nothing in these statutes
suggests a policy of changing the content of state law where it applies. Once
state law wins in the Erie balance, these statutes have little to say about New
York versus Delaware versus Texas.185
Here I should pause for a moment to address the counterpoints from
Professor Wolff, who has thought deeply about these same questions and
came to different conclusions.186 Wolff wrote the following about CAFA:
The Class Action Fairness Act instructs federal courts to employ its targeted
grant of jurisdiction to protect defendants against abusive state-court
litigation, protect the interests of class members, safeguard national
economic interests, and prevent excesses of state power. The statute has the
purpose and expectation that removing class actions from state to federal
court will produce different results in the adjudication of state-law claims
because federal courts will employ different certification standards and will
apply the underlying substantive law more fairly. In other words, CAFA
encourages results-oriented forum shopping. It marks a fundamental shift away from the
jurisdictional policy of the Erie doctrine.187

I respectfully dissent from Wolff about both “results-oriented forum
shopping” and “a fundamental shift.”
First, although CAFA might encourage some results-oriented forum
shopping, that charge could be made of any provision for concurrent
jurisdiction (inviting plaintiffs to forum shop) and any provision allowing for
removal or transfer (inviting defendants to forum shop). Merely asserting that
CAFA encourages results-oriented forum shopping, therefore, does little to

182

183

184
185

186
187

See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (“Congress deliberately
sought to channel cases against foreign sovereigns away from the state courts and into federal courts
. . . .”).
See, e.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65–66 (1979) (dignified tribunal); Akhil Reed Amar,
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989)
(geography); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82
CAL. L. REV. 555 (1994) (“[T]he grant of original jurisdiction constitutionally establishes a federal
judicial role in assuring state compliance with federal law . . . .”).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); Bradt, supra note 156, at 845.
Or, in the words of Professor Green: “It is highly probable that all other forms of federal jurisdiction
for state law actions are, like diversity, created by Congress to address particular deficiencies with the
presumptive state fora. Congress creates federal jurisdiction for state law actions for reasons, and
these reasons must be that something about state court jurisdiction is inadequate.” Green, supra note
125, at 1917. Again, nothing here about deficiencies in state choice of law.
See generally Wolff, supra note 38.
Id. at 1889–90 (emphasis added).
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demonstrate that it should be treated differently than other jurisdictional
statutes.
More importantly, Wolff suggested that CAFA represented a shift away
from the policy of Erie, presumably because it encouraged forum shopping
where Erie sought to discourage it. But the Erie doctrine is not concerned with
all results-oriented forum shopping. The Erie doctrine is not addressed to
results-oriented forum shopping that is driven by differences that arise from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or by differences that arise from the
behavior of federal judges or juries—which, you might notice, are exactly the
types of results-oriented forum shopping encouraged by CAFA.188 In other
words, CAFA is about results-oriented shopping among issues to which Erie
and Klaxon do not call for state law to apply.189
Indeed, none of these jurisdictional statutes (including CAFA) says
anything about horizontal choice of law that differentiates them from the
diversity statute to which Klaxon applies.190 At a minimum, therefore, there is
no basis in the jurisdictional statutes to apply Klaxon in diversity cases and
federal choice-of-law rules elsewhere. So, again, even if Klaxon is not your
preferred rule, the policies of Erie point to consistent choice-of-law treatment
across types of jurisdiction, and Klaxon is the only candidate to do so under
current law.191
More generally, I would say that there should be a presumption against
reading jurisdictional statutes to disrupt state choice-of-law rules. This is not

188

189

190
191

See Burbank, Couch, supra note 48, at 1950 (CAFA “enable[ed] litigants in cases of a certain aggregate
size and in which there is minimal diversity to have access, even at the behest of an in-state
defendant, either to a different law (of “procedure”), or at least to courts that have a different
attitude toward aggregate litigation . . . “); cf. Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And
What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245
(2008) (arguing that Erie should permit less forum shopping for procedure).
Professor Burbank argued that CAFA “authorized the sort of jurisdictional manipulation that Erie
jurisprudence sought to foreclose, enabling litigants in cases of a certain aggregate size and in which
there is minimal diversity to have access, even at the behest of an in-state defendant, either to a
different law (of ‘procedure’), or at least to courts that have a different attitude toward aggregate
litigation, and in any event access to a potentially different outcome on the certification question.”
Burbank, Couch, supra note 48, at 1950. I dissent (respectfully, of course) from the characterization
of “the sort of jurisdictional manipulation that Erie jurisprudence sought to foreclose.” As Professor
Burbank suggested later in the sentence that the type of jurisdiction shopping CAFA addressed was
related to procedure. To me, that is not the sort of jurisdiction shopping to which Erie was addressed,
since the Rules Enabling Act ensured that federal and state cases could apply different procedures
even when Erie called for the application of the same substantive law.
See supra note 51 (noting that Klaxon is here to stay for diversity cases).
This is the weak form of my argument that I have mentioned throughout—i.e., the need for a single
horizontal choice-of-law regime in federal court calls for the extension of Klaxon.

December 2021]

HORIZONTAL CHOICE OF LAW

2159

exactly a presumption against preemption192 or an invocation of the
elephant-in-a-mousehole doctrine,193 but the common-sense idea that
jurisdictional statutes are about jurisdiction (and not about choice of law).
This commonsense idea has a parallel notion: choice-of-law statutes are
about choice of law. And it is to a choice-of-law statute that I turn next.
The Rules of Decision Act. Another potential basis for Erie’s jurisdictional
policies is the Rules of Decision Act (RDA). Here, too, the RDA supports my
reading of Erie’s policies and the concomitant call to follow Klaxon whenever
state law applies in federal court.
The role of the RDA in Erie cases has never been entirely clear. Professor
Burbank has ably argued that it is a false dichotomy to ask whether Erie was
interpreting the RDA or something else.194 He also argued strenuously for
taking the RDA seriously, though he was careful to suggest that his solutions
(e.g., to interjurisdictional preclusion) were consistent with the RDA but did
not depend on it.195 I take the same position: The RDA supports my reading
of Klaxon’s wider application, though readers who choose to ignore the RDA
are free to jump to the next heading.196

192
193

194

195

196

See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at 788 (“The debate about the wisdom of the course
taken in diversity cases after Erie has included the question whether, in effecting a policy against
different outcomes on the basis of citizenship, the Court was interpreting the Rules of Decision Act
or something else. The dichotomy is false. The policy against different outcomes on the basis of
citizenship is a ‘policy of federal jurisdiction’; it evidently derives from the act of Congress conferring
diversity jurisdiction on the federal courts. In considering whether the Constitution or acts of
Congress (including the Rules Enabling Act) require the application of federal law, the federal
courts must consider both policies grounded in those sources pointing towards a federal rule and
policies pointing to the application of state law.”).
Id. at 796 (“The Rules of Decision Act is the common vehicle [for assessing the relationship of
federal and state law], and it is time to take the statute seriously.”). Of course, Burbank is not alone
on this point. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974);
Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate
Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy,
and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989); Richard D.
Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637 (1998).
See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989) (“It is time to pay
final respects to the Rules of Decision Act.”). Readers who think that the RDA is simply redundant
of Erie, or that it merely restates the law that would apply without it, are also welcome to skip ahead,
but with less alacrity than those who reject the RDA outright. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The
Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 999 n.45 (2011) (“The RDA merely
declares the status quo, while incorporating by reference the principles that the more recent Erie
jurisprudence has continued to define.”).
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Professor Burbank’s views about how to take the RDA seriously are also
applicable here. He wrote: “We may quickly dispense with the Court’s
suggestion, based on language in Erie, that the [Rules of Decision] Act is
confined to diversity cases. That suggestion finds no support in the language
of the Act, in history, or in the Court’s own fumblings with the Act in
nondiversity cases.”197 I could not have said it better myself. The RDA speaks
about the laws of the several states as providing the rules of decision in federal
court where they apply. Not a word about jurisdictional basis. The original
RDA was limited to cases at law, which to me implies that Congress
considered the scope of this choice-of-law statute, but chose not to ground it
in the jurisdictional bases found elsewhere in the Judiciary Act. And despite
some “fumblings,” the Court has looked to the RDA outside of diversity.198
But wait, you might say, Klaxon announced a rule of federal common law,
so the Klaxon rule is among the situations where state law does not apply.
There are at least two reasons to take seriously the RDA in horizontal choice
of law. First, one might agree with Professor Burbank who read “the Rules
of Decision Act as speaking directly to the circumstances in which it is
permissible to fashion or apply federal common law.”199 I have more to say
about federal common law below.200
Second, even if one does not read the RDA as “speaking directly” to
federal common lawmaking, the policies of the RDA are consistent with this
Article’s analysis. The RDA is consistent with the jurisdictional policy
(discussed above) that seeks to avoid affecting state-created rights based on
the accident of federal jurisdiction. And the RDA is consistent with the
institutional policies (discussed below) that seek to protect state interests and
to limit the power of federal judges.201 Or, to coin a phrase, the Klaxon
approach operates “under the influence, if not the command,” of the
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199
200
201

Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at 760.
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614–16 (1895) (Rules of Decision Act “itself neither contains
nor suggests . . . a distinction” between federal-question cases and diversity cases); D’Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469–70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
For other scholarly treatments, see Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at n.116
(collecting sources).
See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at 789.
See infra Sections III.A & B.
The quotation from Burbank in the prior paragraph continued: “The natural tendency of
institutions to seize the moment to expand their power is thus bounded by a requirement of resort
for authority to policy choices made on other occasions through different, more democratic,
processes.” See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at 790. This policy of the RDA
points toward Klaxon whether or not it so requires.

December 2021]

HORIZONTAL CHOICE OF LAW

2161

RDA.202 And again, there is absolutely nothing in the RDA to suggest that it
applies differently depending on the basis of jurisdiction.
Legal Context. Finally, any fair analysis of the role of Klaxon must account
for the context in which Klaxon applies. That context further supports my
reading of the policies of Erie and Klaxon.
First, Klaxon incorporates state choice of law only if the choice is consistent
with the Constitution. Principles of due process and full faith and credit limit
the acceptable choices of law.203 Concerns about the most egregious
intrusions on state sovereignty or individual rights need not be directed to
horizontal choice of law in federal court—the Constitution handles those
issues in other ways.204
Second, Klaxon applies only when a federal court has decided that state
rather than federal law applies. In other words, cases implicating a strong
federal interest may not even reach Klaxon.205 Professor Wolff, for example,
made much of cases such as Hinderlider in which the Supreme Court
acknowledged a strong federal interest in resolving interstate conflicts.206
Wolff translated this interest into a call for federal choice-of-law rules in
certain circumstances. But, of course, Hinderlider accommodated the federal
interest by applying preemptive federal substantive law to the interstate water
dispute.207 This approach makes sense—it would be odd to have a rule
protecting a strong federal interest in resolving interstate conflicts that only
applied in diversity cases in federal court, when such issues also could arise
in a state court208 or in federal court under any type of jurisdiction (not just
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Quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) and Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345
U.S. 514 (1953); 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE. § 4506 (3d ed.) (2021 Update).
These constitutional limits on state choice of law also may make it difficult to interpret some of the earlier
cases that suggested that Klaxon does not apply outside of diversity. For example, in his concurring
opinion in Vanston Bondholders, Justice Frankfurter ignored Kentucky’s choice-of-law rule, but there is
reason to suspect that this position reflected Frankfurter’s concern about the constitutionality of
Kentucky rule, rather than any particular view about Klaxon. See Wolff, supra note 38.
See, e.g., Clearfield Tr. Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. 363, 366–70 (1943).
See Wolff, supra note 38, at 1886 (“[T]he interstate relations question of how to resolve a conflict
among multiple state laws that all purport to govern the same dispute is distinctively federal. It is
analogous to the resolution of competing state-law claims over the flow of interstate rivers that was
addressed in Hinderlider—a clash of conflicting state interests arising from overlapping extensions of
state law.”).
See Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (“For whether the water of an interstate
stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon
which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.”).
See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006).
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in diversity cases).209 Only uniform federal law, not horizontal choice of law,
could do the trick.
This last point merits further attention in the context of complex
litigation. One of the arguments against Klaxon in CAFA and MDL (and
bankruptcy, for that matter) is that those disputes involve national problems
that require national solutions.210 I dispute the premise that these cases
always involve national problems.211 But even if they did, that would not
support departures from Klaxon. There may be national controversies that
require national solutions, but a federal choice-of-law rule—for example, the
law of the home of the defendant212—is not a national solution. Instead, it is
a single-state solution, just relying on a different method of selecting the
state.213 And it would be even less “national” because it would apply only in
federal court (not state courts),214 and it would apply only to parties
proceeding in the aggregate (not as individuals).215 The true “national”
solution is uniform federal law—but by the time we get to Klaxon, that is water
under the bridge.
C. Institutional Policies
Erie is a statement of jurisdictional policy, but it is not only a statement of
jurisdictional policy. Erie also is a statement of institutional policies along two
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Hinderlider itself clarified that the interstate conflict in that case was a federal question. See 304 U.S. at
111 (“Jurisdiction over controversies concerning rights in interstate streams is not different from those
concerning boundaries. These have been recognized as presenting federal questions.”).
See supra note 120.
See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 106 (demonstrating the variety of cases in MDLs); Silberman, supra note
109 (describing the “overinclusiveness of the cases brought into federal court under CAFA” with
respect to federal choice of law).
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 109 (making such a proposal).
See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 109 (making a similar point).
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 132, at 578 n.122 (“Note that my argument also suggests that any federal
choice-of-law rules should apply . . . in both state and federal courts. It may be, in other words, that
state law in the area of choice of law should be displaced because federal rules will do a better job
umpiring conflicts among the states. But if Congress enacts choice-of-law rules, it should make those
rules applicable in both state and federal courts.”).
See, e.g., id. at 578 (“[I]t is unfair to change a party’s rights because lawyers and judges find it
expedient to structure a lawsuit one way rather than another. Whatever rights I have if I litigate
individually should be the same if, for reasons of convenience and efficiency, I am asked to litigate
with others.”); Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What
They Are, What They Might Be, Part II: Non-Jurisdictional Matters, 42 UCLA L. REV. 967, 1000 (1995)
(“[C]ourts never have viewed the policies that underlie the Van Dusen line of cases as inapplicable
or overridden where cases were consolidated, and I do not see that calling the consolidation a single
civil action should change that.”).
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dimensions: federalism and the separation of powers.216 These policies also
point to the application of Klaxon outside of diversity. This Section takes them
in turn.
Protecting State Interests. The Erie doctrine is a federalism doctrine. Although
there may be debates about the relative importance of federalism in Erie, I
think it is beyond peradventure that Erie and its progeny were concerned with
protecting state interests.217 The Rules of Decision Act also invokes a
federalism principle when calling for the application of state law.218
Klaxon, too, is about federalism. As Justice Reed explained for the
majority in Klaxon:
Whatever lack of uniformity [the Klaxon rule] may produce between federal
courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to
a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue
local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal
courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent “general
law” of conflict of laws. Subject only to review by this Court on any federal
question that may arise, Delaware is free to determine whether a given
matter is to be governed by the law of the forum or some other law. This
Court’s views are not the decisive factor in determining the applicable
conflicts rule. And the proper function of the Delaware federal court is to
ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be.219

In short, Klaxon furthers Erie’s institutional policy of federalism by
respecting state interest reflected in state choice of law.
Importantly, even though the Klaxon decision itself mentions diversity,220
its federalism policy is not limited to diversity cases. More precisely, two
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For one prominent recognition of these policies, see Redish, supra note 195, at 767 (“[I]t is incorrect
to suggest . . . that the issue of federal common law gives rise primarily to problems of federalism,
rather than to those of separation of powers. In this context, the two structural political values are
inextricably intertwined. The legislature, traditionally more responsive to state concerns than the
federal judiciary, has chosen to protect federalism interests by legislatively limiting federal judicial
power to supplant state law. In light of the existence of the Rules of Decision Act, then, whether or
not a ban on judicial common law making power is politically advisable is not, within our structure
of separation of powers, a matter for judicial resolution.”).
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). See also Burbank, Couch, supra note 48, at 1946(“A
central premise of the Erie decision is that federal courts have no authority to second-guess state
lawmaking institutions, picking and choosing which state institution’s legal products will apply as
rules of decision under the Rules of Decision Act.”); Redish & Phillips, supra note 195 (criticizing
the preoccupation with forum shopping and litigant equality, when the key question is about “the
need to preserve a balance of state and federal interests within the federal system”); Clermont, supra
note 13, at 4 (characterizing Erie as part of “the megadoctrine on the governing law in a system of
federalism”).
28 U.S.C. § 1652.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).
Id. at 496.
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principles lead to the conclusion that Klaxon’s federalism policy should apply
outside of diversity.
The first principle, which almost goes without saying, is that whatever
interest a state has in its law being applied, that interest is agnostic about the
basis of federal jurisdiction. Why does a state care if a plaintiff pleads a state
law claim under diversity or CAFA or any other type of federal jurisdiction?
The second principle is that states have an interest not only in the
application of their substantive law but also in the application of their choice
of law.221 Or to say it another way, a state’s choice of law reflects state policy.
In the quotation above, the Klaxon Court acknowledged that states are free
to make independent policy choices, and that those choices include the
selection of another state’s laws.222 This view is also consistent with modern
notions of choice of law.223
Putting these together, a state’s interest in its choice of law is agnostic as
to the basis of federal jurisdiction. If a state decides the best policy is to follow
lex loci delicti or the most significant relationship for torts, that policy judgment
would obtain whether the case is filed in state court, removed to federal court
on diversity, removed to federal court on some other basis, consolidated into
an MDL, or swept into a bankruptcy proceeding.
In theory, the basis of federal jurisdiction could give us a clue about the
strength or content of the federal interest against which this state interest is
balanced.224 But once a federal court has gotten to the point of choosing
among state laws, it has concluded that, on balance, state interests win out.
Nor is there anything in the jurisdictional statutes to suggest that they reflect
different preferences about horizontal choice of law depending on the basis of
jurisdiction.225 Respecting state interest, therefore, requires extending Klaxon.
Please, dear reader, do not infer from the shortness of this discussion that
it is unimportant. The Erie doctrine is deeply concerned with federalism.
Some have argued that it is primarily a federalism doctrine.226 Erie’s
federalism policy flows directly into Klaxon based on the (correct) assumption
that state choice of law is reflective of state policy. Any other outcome would

221
222
223
224
225
226

See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (collecting sources and explaining this principle).
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bradt, supra note 31 (citing Cavers and others).
See supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178–85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 217.
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be a backdoor to undercut the protection of state interests, by claiming to
apply state law but then allowing federal law to choose among the states.227
Constraining Federal Judges. Professor Burbank observed that federal judges
possess “perfectly natural desires to maximize their own power and to serve
their own institutional interests.”228 Erie and Klaxon are checks on those natural
desires, disempowering federal judges in favor of Congress and the states.
Turning first to Erie, Brandeis’s rejection of federal general common law was a
conscious attack on the power of federal judges.229 As Purcell observed, Brandeis’s
“fundamental goal” in Erie was “restructuring the constitutional balance between
Congress and the federal courts.”230 Erie did not eliminate all federal common law,
but it stood for the proposition that Swift allowed too much of it.231 And to the
extent that Erie is yoked to the RDA,232 the decision can be understood as
constraining judges in favor of following a congressional directive.233
Erie alone was not a sufficient bulwark against federal judicial
lawmaking.234 As Professor Wolff pointed out, Erie was threatened by equity
(to which there was a dispute whether Erie would apply) and by choice of law
(which would give federal judges the ability to make law by other means).235
The Supreme Court defended Erie’s institutional policy by bringing equity
under its sway and by taking choice of law out of federal judges’ hands.236

227
228

229
230
231
232
233
234

235

236

In this way, departures from Klaxon might fit Professor Spencer’s definition of “anti-federalist”
procedure. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233 (2007).
Burbank, Semtek, supra note 1. To be sure, federal judges at time have incentives to abstain or other
seemingly contract their power. But asserting a new federal choice-of-law rule undoubtedly would
fit into Burbank’s description.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938).
See Purcell, supra note 30.
304 U.S. 64.
See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2; Redish, supra note 195.
See Burbank, Couch, supra note 48, at 1948 (“Here, as in its federal common law jurisprudence more
generally, the Court has preferred to maximize its own power by neglecting statutes that might be
thought to constrain or channel exercises of that power, including the Rules of Decision Act, the
very statute it construed in Erie . . . .”).
See Wolff, supra note 38. As to choice of law, Wolff writes: “The threat that conflicts doctrine posed
to the core holding of Erie was perhaps not as great as that posed by equity practice, since choice of
law putatively requires a selection among state liability regimes rather than the independent
definition of the parties’ rights that equity could entail. Still, the characterization of doctrines as
‘procedural’ rather than ‘substantive’—the type of dispute that gave rise to both Klaxon and
Sampson—gave courts leeway in shaping and defining the rights of parties, and the Court clearly
wanted to yoke federal diversity courts firmly to state policy to prevent mischief in general diversity
cases.” Id. at 1880–81.
Id. Professor Gluck observed that state statutory interpretation may be yet another area in which
federal judges may skirt the constraints of Erie, see Gluck, supra note 168, and Professor Little
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Klaxon thus constrains federal judges but not federal legislators, who may
adopt federal choice of law.237
To be sure, the move in Klaxon also had the result of giving more power
to state judges (who often make state choice of law). But as Professor Burbank
remarked, “[w]hen state substantive rights have been in question, from the
perspective of purposes or effects, federal judges have not in the past been
permitted to act with the autonomy of state judges.”238 It also should be
mentioned that the federal separation of powers has been replicated in all the
states. States may choose to give their courts more or less lawmaking power,
and many states have decided to make judges more directly subject to the
democratic process.239
In any event, Erie and Klaxon embody a policy of constraining federal
judges. And if anything, the attitude of the Supreme Court toward federal
common lawmaking has only gotten more hostile since those decisions.240
For example, the Court in Rodriguez reminded that “[j]udicial lawmaking in
the form of federal common law plays a necessarily modest role under a
Constitution that vests the federal government’s ‘legislative Powers’ in
Congress and reserves most other regulatory authority to the States.”241
The remaining question is whether this separation-of-powers policy is tied
to diversity jurisdiction. The answer, again, is no. There is nothing in Erie, the
jurisdictional statutes, or the RDA to support the claim that federal judges
should have freer hands to alter state choice of law based on the type of
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241

observed the same about the Erie guess. See Laura E. Little, Erie’s Unintended Consequence: Federal Courts
Creating State Law, 52 AKRON L. REV. 275, 285 (2018).
The approach here is congenial with a RDA approach, as the RDA’s reference to state law provides
a mechanical alternative to federal judicial choice of law. Or as Professor Burbank remarked, “The
natural tendency of institutions to seize the moment to expand their power is thus bounded by a
requirement of resort for authority to policy choices made on other occasions through different,
more democratic, processes.” Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at 7902.
See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at 796. For a comment on Professor Burbank’s
reference to “state substantive rights” here and elsewhere, see infra notes 291–93 and accompanying
text.
See generally, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001). Professor Redish reached a similar point from a different vantage.
He argued that, at the time of the framing, states’ rights advocates were more concerned with
overreach by the federal judiciary than the federal legislature, given the states’ more direct
representation in Congress. Redish, supra note 195, at 791–92. Such an interpretation of the RDA
also points to constraining federal judges more than federal legislators or state judges.
See, e.g., 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4518 (3d ed., 2019) (discussing Vanston Bondholders). This historical trend also might
inform our reading of precedent such as Vanston Bondholders, which suggested in dicta a role for
federal courts in choosing law in bankruptcy. 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S.Ct. 713, 717 (2020).
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jurisdiction. Again, those jurisdictional bases may call for more or less federal
law, but they do not speak to federal judge’s ability to choose among state laws.
* * *
The jurisdictional policies of Erie support the extension of Klaxon because
it is the presence of state law in federal court—not any basis of jurisdiction—
that implicates the twin aims of Erie. Jurisdiction shopping and inequitable
administration are risks whenever the basis of federal jurisdiction determines
the horizontal choice of law. The institutional policies of Erie—the twin aims
of federalism and the separation of powers—further support applying Klaxon
across the board. Klaxon supports state substantive interests where they are
reflected in state choice of law, and Klaxon works to constrain federal judges
when they seek to make mischief with respect to state law in federal court.
Whether we locate these principles in Erie, the RDA, or elsewhere, they have
force independent of the basis of federal jurisdiction.
D. Direct Filing and the Spirit of Klaxon
Before leaving the discussion of Klaxon and applied state law, I must pause
on an unusual set of situations that seemingly creates a tension between the
arguments of this Section and the Klaxon rule. That is, cases in which a quirk
of federal practice leads them to be filed in a forum state other than the one
where they would have been filed under normal circumstances.
Two common situations come to mind.242 First, in multidistrict litigation,
some MDL judges have encouraged a practice called “direct filing” in which
the defendants waive any objections to filing directly in the MDL court,
rather than having plaintiffs file in a proper venue and then seek transfer into
the MDL.243 Second, in bankruptcy, earlier examples have focused on
situations such as Purdue Pharma where pending state law claims are
dragged across the country into a bankruptcy, typically in the debtor’s home
state.244 But some potential claims will not be filed before the bankruptcy,
and are later filed directly in the bankruptcy proceeding.245

242

243
244
245

A less common situation is the original action in the U.S. Supreme Court. It would be odd if all
such actions applied the choice of law of the District of Columbia. I would adopt this Section’s
proposal for such actions as well.
See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897, 904 (E.D. La. 2007). See generally Bradt,
supra note 31 (describing this process in detail).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Professor Green described the situation thusly: “Bankruptcy proceedings will generally be brought
in the district of the debtor’s residence (for an individual) or state of incorporation, principal place
of business, or location of assets (for a business). The bankruptcy court in that district will have
jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property, no matter where it is located, and nationwide service
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The challenge in these situations is that direct filing into the MDL or the
bankruptcy proceeding permits the jurisdictional manipulation and resulting
inequities that Klaxon sought to avoid.
Never fear, Professor Bradt has offered a thoughtful solution to MDL
direct filing that also can be adopted for bankruptcy. Bradt suggested that
every direct-filed MDL complaint should include a declaration of the
plaintiff’s hypothetical filing court (a “home venue”), to be selected among
those courts where the case could have been brought.246 Similarly, state law
claims raised in the first instance in bankruptcy might include a “home
venue” declaration.247 The home venue declaration would allow the court to
follow the choice of law of the state in which the case would have been filed—
that is, Klaxon in spirit.
This solution tracks the approach taken in transferred cases under Van
Dusen v. Barrack,248 and it is consistent with this Article’s policy arguments—it
limits jurisdiction shopping, respects the states, and constrains federal judges.
In response to concerns with plaintiff manipulation, note that the “home
venue” must be one in which the case could have been brought.249 Defendants
should have the ability to challenge the hypothetical home venue in what
would amount to a hypothetical motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b).250
These small tweaks extend Klaxon functionally, while my proposals above
extend it formally. Taken together, this Part argues that (actual or declared)
forum-state choice of law should govern whenever state law applies in federal
court. This approach responds to jurisdictional manipulation while also
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248
249
250

of process is available. Thus, it can entertain a state law action even though the action could not
have been entertained by a forum state court.” Green, supra note 125, at 1925.
Bradt, supra note 31. Bradt identified at least one court that had adopted this solution. See In re
FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 07-1873, 2012 WL 1580761, at *1
(E.D. La. May 4, 2012).
This is not to suggest that plaintiffs would be prohibited from waiving this option or from
negotiating with defendants regarding the choice of law. Instead, the proposal here is to make the
“home venue” designation the default rule against which such negotiations would occur.
Professor Green offered a judge-driven solution, asking the court to determine if there is a singular
venue where the case would have been brought. See Green, supra note 125. If so, Green called for
Klaxon as applied to that court. If not, then Green countenanced federal choice of law. Professor
Cross also asked the judge to determine where the case would have been filed. See Cross, supra note
70. I prefer applying Bradt’s solution to bankruptcy for all of the reasons I support Klaxon: further
reducing jurisdictional manipulation; further protecting state interests reflected in choice of law;
and further constraining federal judges.
376 U.S. 612 (1964).
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (limiting venue transfers to courts where the case could have been brought).
Bradt, supra note 31.
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supporting the federalism and separation-of-powers policies of the Erie
doctrine, the RDA, and the federal jurisdictional statutes.
III. EXTENSIONS: FEDERAL COMMON LAW, SEMTEK, AND CONGRESS
The foregoing analysis called for federal courts to follow Klaxon when state
law applies directly. But these cases are not the only instances in which state
law makes an appearance in federal court. This Part draws on the lessons
above to—more tentatively—call for the further extension of Klaxon into
cases involving federal common law, interjurisdictional preclusion, and
congressional direction.251 I will take each of these in turn.
A. Federal Common Law
At the end of the Erie analysis, sometimes a federal court will decide that
federal law applies.252 That federal law may take the form of federal common
law, thus raising the question: What is the content of the federal common law?
Early decisions from the Supreme Court did not provide clear guidance,
but eventually the Supreme Court settled on an approach exemplified in
United States v. Kimbell Foods.253 Kimbell Foods is a case about the priority of
contract liens arising from federal loan programs. An Erie analysis led the
Court to conclude that federal common law governed. “Controversies
directly affecting the operations of federal programs, although governed by
federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules,” the
Court explained.254 The Court saw two options: “adopt state law” or
“fashion a nationwide federal rule.”255 The Court has since suggested that
adopting state law is the presumptive choice.256
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254
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To careful readers, I would acknowledge that interjurisdictional preclusion is a species of federal
common law, and that Congress may call for the application or adoption of state law, but I choose
these categories because they are useful in spelling out the analysis here.
See, e.g., Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–69 (1943). This federal law should
apply in state court, per “Reverse Erie” or preemption. See Clermont, supra note 13. I do not take
up here examples of “federal procedural common law” that apply only in federal court. See, e.g.,
Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008).
440 U.S. 715 (1979). See generally Clermont, supra note 29; Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal
Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
797 (1957).
440 U.S. 715.
Id. See generally 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4518 (3d ed.) (2021 Update).
See, e.g., Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715; Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991); Semtek
Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507(2001); O’Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512
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Adopted state law is different than the applied state law of Part II in a
number of respects.257 For one, while federal courts may not create
exceptions to applied state law, they may create exceptions to adopted state
law to protect federal interests.258 A review of “adoption” decisions from
federal courts of appeals revealed that these exceptions are real but rare.259
A second asserted feature of “adoption” cases is that they do not
necessarily follow forum-state choice of law—that is, they do not necessarily
follow Klaxon.260 The Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods and later cases did not
specify a clear approach to horizontal choice of adopted law,261 and courtof-appeals decisions on adopting state law have not done so either.262 Indeed,
the most common approach seems to be identifying the state law to be
adopted without explanation.263
This lack of clarity should be remedied. At a minimum, it would be
helpful if federal courts announced more clear guidance on how to adopt
state law.
Moreover, at least when there is no obvious federal interest in any
particular choice of law approach, I suggest that federal courts presumptively
follow Klaxon for selecting the state law to be adopted. This Klaxon approach
would still permit federal courts to craft exceptions to protect federal
interests. But unless the federal court can articulate such an interest with
specificity, it should adopt state law consistent with the choice of law of the
forum state.264

257
258

259

260
261

262
263

264

U.S. 79, 80–81 (1994); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 356–57 (1966); see also Clermont, supra
note 29, at 258 (describing the adoption of state law as a “rebuttable presumption”).
See generally, Clermont, supra note 29.
See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715. For the clearest example in a Supreme Court case, see United States
v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (creating an exception to state law that
discriminated against the federal government’s rights in land).
See William French Erie’s Other Horizontal Choice of Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (collecting examples); see, e.g., Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners L.P., 913 F.3d 959,
967–68 (10th Cir. 2019).
See generally, Clermont, supra note 29.
Semtek is an adoption case, directing that federal preclusion law in diversity cases should adopt the law
that the forum state would have applied. Preclusion is a special case because it involves a separate, prior
proceeding, so I do not think it is particularly persuasive for other adoption cases—though note that my
proposal is consistent with Semtek’s Klaxon-like approach. See infra note 289 and accompanying text. I have
more to say on Semtek and how its rule should be updated infra Section III.B.
See French, supra note 259.
See id. This approach recalls Judge Brandeis’s breezy assertion that Pennsylvania law applied in
Erie—a choice that would not have accorded with Klaxon had that case been on the books. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
Though beyond the scope here, I also would query whether, in adoption cases, federal courts should
not repair to the “Erie guess.” See, e.g., 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
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To begin, I should acknowledge that the case for adoptive Klaxon is
weaker than for applied Klaxon based on the values discussed above.
Jurisdiction shopping between bases of jurisdiction is not an issue here.265
Federalism still points to respecting forum state choice of law,266 but the
federalism interest must be weaker when the law being applied is federal
law.267 Constraining federal judges also supports using Klaxon’s mechanical
approach for adoption,268 though having already authorized federal judges
to make common law, this horse is at least partway out of the barn. That
said, an unguided ability to choose among state laws is exactly the
institutional concern present in Klaxon,269 and current practice in the federal
courts suggests that federal judges are unguided in their selection of adopted
state law.270 The rote use of Klaxon for adoption would be a dramatic
improvement on this dimension.271
Of course, using Klaxon for adoption would mean that federal law would
apply differently depending on where a case is filed. While this horizontal
disuniformity is permitted for applied state law,272 it is possible that there is a
federal interest in avoiding it for federal common law.
To my mind, the questions are how strong is this interest and what weighs
against it. As to the strength of the interest, observe that adopted state law
exists only where Congress and the federal courts have not opted for uniform
federal law.273 And when a federal contract is at issue, adopted state law is
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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (3d ed.) (2021 Update). Professor Clermont
suggested that this is not required in adoption cases, but perhaps it should be. See Clermont, supra
note 29, at 261.
See supra notes 143–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 217–27 and accompanying text.
Relatedly, if one believed that the Rules of Decision Act played a role in the content of federal
common law, then it too would point to Klaxon here. See, e.g., Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion,
supra note 2, at 789 (“The approach advocated here regards the Rules of Decision Act as speaking
directly to the circumstances in which it is permissible to fashion or apply federal common law. It
has the obvious effect of imposing discipline on the first of those processes.”).
See supra notes 228–41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text.
Klaxon is also a focal point around which courts can easily converge, rather than expecting disparate
federal choices to settle on predictable approaches without Supreme Court or congressional
guidance. Cf. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2019: Thirty-Third Annual
Survey, 68 AM. J. COMP. L. 235 (2020) (documenting the varied approaches in the states). And,
indeed, reviewing the case law on adopted state law reveals that the federal courts have not
articulated anything even approximating a consistent approach. See supra notes 260–63 and
accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
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relevant only if government did not specify the choice of law in the
contract.274 Even when adopted state law governs, any particularized federal
interest could be protected via exceptions.275 These outlets for federal
interests imply that, in the remainder where adopted state law governs, the
federal interest in uniform adoption is not strong.
As to the countervailing interests, in addition to the (weaker) arguments
about federalism and the separation of powers mentioned above, using Klaxon
for adoption has a number of advantages. Within disputes, Klaxon produces
consistency across claims. Consider, for example, a contract provision
releasing liability for all potential claims arising from an environmental
accident. For claims arising under state law, the validity of the release will be
determined by the state law that the forum state would apply.276 For claims
arising under federal law (e.g., under CERCLA277), federal common law
would adopt state contract law on releases.278 Which state’s law? Only using
Klaxon for adoption would ensure that the same state’s contract law would
apply to the same release in the same case.279 Klaxon thus avoids inconsistency
within disputes.
With or without multiple claims, using forum-state choice of law may
help reduce the disruption of state law. In Kimbell Foods, the Court suggested
that a strong argument for adopting state law is to avoid interference with
“important and carefully evolved state arrangements designed to serve
multiple purposes.”280 When more than one state’s laws could apply, some
risk of interference is unavoidable,281 but courts should aim to minimize it.
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Kimbell Foods itself is a case involving federal contracts, see supra notes 253–55 and accompanying
text, and many adoption cases are decided against the backdrop of federal contracts. See French,
supra note 259.
See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
This would be true in state court (applying forum state choice of law) or federal court (following
Klaxon).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
See, e.g., ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 762 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2014) (“So long as they do
not jeopardize federal goals, parties should be free to waive contribution protection through
contracts governed by state law.”).
A dozen states would look to the place of contracting, while the others would follow some form of
“modern” choice-of-law analysis. See generally Symeonides, supra note 271.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 729–30 (1979) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382
U.S. 341, 353 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is a quotation about state commercial
law, but I think it applies just as well to many other areas in which federal law adopts state law.
To elaborate: If federal common law adopted state law in a way that was forum-agnostic, then there
would be disuniformity when a forum state would treat the provision differently under state law than
it would be treated under federal law (adopting state law). If federal common law adopted state law
by following the forum state’s choice of law, then there would be disuniformity when claims could be
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Judges could attempt to divine which state’s laws are most likely to apply in
all potential cases, and then use this divination as the basis for federal choice
of law.282 Alternatively, federal courts could treat the existence of an actual
case litigating the issue as a proxy for where litigation is likely to occur—thus
they would adopt the law that the forum state would choose. In this way,
adoptive Klaxon might minimize intrusions on state law more reliably than
privileging some forum where claims might be litigated in some other case.
Incorporating Klaxon into adopted state law also smooths out—and, dare
I say, improves—the spectrum of Erie doctrines. Currently, there is a
discontinuity where Erie chooses between state and federal law. On one side
of the line is applied state law and state choice of law (Klaxon), and on the
other is adopted state law and independent federal choice of law (not-Klaxon).
If Klaxon were the presumptive rule in adoption cases, however, then the Erie
spectrum might look like this: Where state interest is greatest, state law (and
Klaxon) applies directly. As state interest is reduced or federal interest
increases, we move into adopted Klaxon, where the only practical difference
is that the federal court can create exceptions to protect specific federal
interests.283 Then we move into the territory where federal law adopts state
law independently—that is, where there is a federal interest in the choice-oflaw method.284 Finally we transition to uniform federal law supported by
strong federal interests.
This smoothed-out Erie has more than theoretical appeal. Perhaps most
importantly, it lowers the stakes of the closest Erie questions. Rather than
having courts choose between applied Klaxon and adopted something else,
those cutting-edge Erie decisions only would affect whether the court can
create exceptions. This makes the “outcomes”—that is, the content of the
relevant law—more predictable, because it would almost always be the same
no matter which side of the Erie line the Court decided that the issue fell.285
This approach also makes the Erie inquiry more concrete. In these close

282
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filed in multiple forums (with different choice-of-law regimes). Again, it is impossible to identify an
adoption rule that does not create the risk of some disuniformity or another.
In many cases, this prediction would align with forum-state choice of law, because there is often
consensus (or near consensus) on choice-of-law questions. It is only in cases where there is reasonable
disagreement—and where there is no federal-interest exception—that this choice matters.
This aspect of Kimbell Foods should remain good law. See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
For example, perhaps federal air-pollution law includes a preference for regulating air pollution at
the source, in which case there would be a federal interest in the choice of adopted law in favor of
the law of the place of emission.
I say “almost always” because of the availability of exceptions, but of course those would be
exceptional.
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cases, the real question is whether there are specific federal interests that need
protection via an exception, permitted for adoption (but not pure Klaxon).
In this way, the Klaxon approach to adoption has the effect of retroactively
validating what was a misleading statement of law from Justice Scalia in
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC.286 In O’Melveny, the Supreme Court held that
federal common law incorporated California law regarding the imputation
of knowledge to the FDIC. The Court spent time determining whether an
exception to California law was warranted, indicating that it was adopting
rather than applying state law. But at one point, Justice Scalia downplayed
the adopt-apply distinction: “it is of only theoretical interest whether the basis
for that application [of California’s rule] is California’s own sovereign power
or federal adoption of California’s disposition.”287 This flip remark was
wrong because applied and adopted state law operate differently with respect
to the horizontal choice of law. But Justice Scalia’s statement reflects what
this paper argues the law should be. There is something appealing about the
approach of O’Melveny—which turns the knife’s edge of the Erie doctrine into
a (mostly) theoretical inquiry, other than the ability to create exceptions when
concrete federal interests are on the line.
For these reasons, courts should presumptively follow forum-state choice
of law when adopting state law as federal common law.
B. Preclusion
Semtek v. Lockheed Martin was “complexity on stilts.”288 For present
purposes, we can jump to its holding: Uniform federal common law governs
the preclusive effect of federal court judgments in federal question cases, and
federal common law adopts the preclusion law that would be applied by
forum-state courts in diversity cases (citing inter alia Klaxon).289
This holding drew heavily on the work of Professor Burbank, though “the
author of the Court’s opinion, well aware of the origins of that solution, chose
not to acknowledge its provenance.”290 Burbank grounded his argument in
the Rules of Decision Act and Erie, and he tied it to the sorts of policies
discussed above. For example, Burbank explained: “Preclusion rules may
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512 U.S. 79 (1994).
Id. at 85.
Burbank, Semtek, supra note 1, at 1047.
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507–08.
Burbank, Semtek, supra note 1, at 1055. The Court, though, did not read Professor Burbank closely
enough. See id. at 1051–52 (explaining that the Supreme Court did not consider when F2 may
depart from F1’s preclusion law for reasons of full faith and credit).
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implicate substantive policies; they have dramatic effects on substantive
rights. When state substantive rights have been in question, from the
perspective of purposes or effects, federal judges have not in the past been
permitted to act with the autonomy of state judges. Rather, they have been
required to do what judges of a particular state would do.”291
I suspect readers know where I am going. Burbank’s quoted statement
speaks of state substantive rights, but the Court’s opinion speaks of
“diversity” cases. To be fair, at many points, Burbank also suggested that
federal preclusion law should adopt state law in “diversity” cases.292 But as
detailed above, I am not persuaded that the type of jurisdiction—as opposed
to the source of law—is the right dividing line. Therefore, I would suggest
revising the Semtek approach to turn not on the basis of jurisdiction but on the
source of law.293 So, for example, if a federal court issued a judgment on a
state law claim in an admiralty case or a Grable-style federal question case,
forum-state preclusion law should be adopted as federal common law.
I felt confident with this solution until an exchange with Professor
Clermont, who pointed out to me the challenge of applying this approach in
a case with a mix of federal- and state-law claims.294 Though my initial
intuition was that the content of preclusion law in such a case also should be
mixed—federal law applying to federal claims; adopted state law applying to
state claims—Professor Clermont rightly observed that preclusion law
applies to judgments (not claims), and attempting to label the claims and
issues as “state” or “federal” could present administrative difficulties in some
cases.295
Based on this exchange, I do not offer a full-throated endorsement of a
uniform rule for the adoption of state preclusion law for any state law claim
in federal court. Instead, I suggest that at a minimum federal preclusion law
should adopt state law in any case where all claims arise under state law, and
I encourage courts to consider whether in “mixed cases” there may be a role
291
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Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 2, at 796.
See, e.g., id. at 636 (“[I]t is extremely difficult, under a traditional federal common law analysis or a
Rules of Decision Act approach, to justify either across-the-board uniform federal preclusion rules
for diversity judgments adjudicating matters of state substantive law, or the borrowing of state
preclusion rules only when they implicate substantive state policies.”).
As Professor Burbank said, “[t]he Court need not apologize for past transgressions, but it should
set its house in order.” Id. at 762.
Professor Gardner raised the added complexity of cases in which the court was unclear about the
source of law, for example where state and federal law were the same. Decades from now at her
festschrift, I hope some newly minted legal scholar takes up this question.
Had this exchange been with Professor Burbank, he might have said that “‘even the most luminous
analytic framework’ can blind us.” Id. at 736 (quoting Chayes).

2176

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol 23:6

of state preclusion law.296 I also encourage readers—including those
luminaries participating in this symposium—to devote their considerable
intellects to the preclusive effect of “mixed judgments” generally, even those
arising from a simple two-party case in which a plaintiff invokes federal
question and diversity jurisdiction on related claims.297
C. Congress
Sometimes Congress makes the call to apply or adopt state law.298 The
Federal Tort Claims Act calls for federal courts to use “the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.”299 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act directs courts to use the law of “adjacent States.”300 Federal Rules of
Evidence 501 and 601 call for federal courts to choose state privilege and
competency law as related to state law claims.301 Arguably, the Rules of
Decision Act,302 the Full Faith and Credit Act,303 and the old Process and
Conformity Acts304 also involved Congress choosing state law.
Congressional direction that state law governs raises horizontal choiceof-law questions. Sometimes Congress answers the question directly, as in the
Federal Tort Claims Act.305 But other times, such as in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Congress is silent. For all of the reasons that readers are sick of
reading, I suggest a presumption that statutes calling for the adoption or
application of state law should be read to incorporate Klaxon’s choice-of-law
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For one analysis of the questions shortly after Semtek, see generally Patrick Woolley, The Sources of
Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2003).
I do not refer here to cases raising federal questions and supplemental state law claims, but a case
in which there is a federal claim and a related state law claim between citizens of different states
seeking more than $75,000.
See generally William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV.
1371 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); cf. supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing FSIA).
43 U.S.C. § 1333(2)(a); see also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 480 (1981).
Fed. R. Ev. 501 & 601.
28 U.S.C. § 1652.
See, e.g., Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (Process Act of 1792); Act of June 1, 1872,
ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (Conformity Act of 1872).
Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (Process Act); Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17
Stat. 196 (Conformity Act); see Clermont, supra note 29.
Statutes such as the FTCA raise a different question: whether to incorporate the state’s whole law
(including its choice of law), or its internal law. In Richards v. United States, 396 U.S. 1, 11 (1962), the
Supreme Court held that the FTCA looked to the whole law of the selected state. For reasons
explained above, I concur this with result. See supra Section III.A.
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method.306 This presumption can be overcome by congressional intent, but
without such intent, Klaxon governs.
One difficult question for some of these statutes is whether Congress is
calling for the application or adoption of state law. And, indeed, I was careful
not to say “apply” or “adopt” in my description of the various statutes above.
One virtue of my approach is that this distinction becomes far less
important—Klaxon governs either way, unless the statute adopts state law and
there are concrete federal interests necessitating an exception. In all other
situations, the federal court would choose the same state law regardless how
the choice is characterized.307
CONCLUSION
Erie and Klaxon are the product of the “accident of diversity,” but the
accident is that the Supreme Court addressed issues of state law in cases that
arose under that head of jurisdiction. The policies of Erie are implicated
whenever state law appears in federal court. Avoiding jurisdiction
manipulation and related inequities, respecting state interests, and limiting
federal judicial lawmaking are aims that are relevant beyond diversity.
Particularly in an era when some of the most socially consequential state law
claims are brought under CAFA, bankruptcy, and MDL, staying true to the
policies of Erie means relying on Klaxon in these cases as well.
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I would apply the same presumption to a Federal Rule adopted through the Rules Enabling Act
process if it called for state law but did not specify which state. Presently, the Federal Rules pointing
to state law include a choice-of-law directive. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a) (incorporating
provisional remedies “under the law of the state where the court is located”).
See supra Section III.A.

